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1. Introduction 
In the continuously changing financial markets, analysts need to make plenty of decisions and 
forecasts with limited amount of information and time. Decision making is not only limited by 
the bounded rationality1 but future predictions almost always include an irreducible intuitive 
component. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find that the general characteristics of intuitive 
judgments under uncertainty are the reliance on heuristics and the presence of common biases. 
Bias means that these errors of judgements are systematic rather than random. 
Ideally, the best analysts do not fall in love with their current recommendations but are ready 
to revise them in the light of new information. They also avoid the opposite mistake of assuming 
that this changes everything. They are good at avoiding under- and overreactions. Nonetheless, 
there is vast evidence that behavioral biases affect analysts as well as other financial market 
professionals2. For instance, Amir and Ganzach (1998) show that anchoring and adjustment 
leads to underreaction in analyst forecasts while representativeness bias leads to overreaction 
and leniency leads to more optimistic predictions. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) refer to anchoring when people make estimates by starting from 
an initial value which is then adjusted to yield the final answer. However, they find that these 
adjustments are usually insufficient and different starting points yield different estimates which 
are biased towards the initial values. In other words, the initial value carries an unreasonably 
high weight in the person’s decision-making process. In the stock market, anchoring can mean 
for e.g. locking your view into a reference point such as purchase price, specific historical stock 
price or relative metrics such as P/E ratio.  
The aim of this thesis is to shed light on the decision-making of the sell-side equity analysts, 
specifically whether analysts partly anchor their views on the company by using rule-of-thumb 
valuation multiples to revise their stock recommendations. In this thesis, the focus is on the 
most commonly used market multiple by analysts, price-to-earnings (P/E ratio). In addition, 
other commonly used market multiples are tested, specifically EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and 
EV/Sales (Pinto et al., 2015). Furthermore, anchoring on PEG ratio (price/earnings to growth) 
is also tested since analysts often justify their recommendations using both P/E and PEG ratios 
(Bradshaw, 2002). Moreover, as Li et al. (2016) find, 52-week high stock price may serve as 
                                                 
1 See Simon (1955) for discussion and theory of physiological limits on human cognition. 
2 For other finance professionals see e.g. Staël Von Holstein (1972), George and Hwang (2004), Yuan (2015). 
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an anchor for analysts. My first hypotheses 1-2 test whether my sample confirms the results of 
Li et al. (2016). 
1.1 Research questions and testable hypotheses 
My first research question relates to the 52-week high phenomenon, specifically, are analysts 
more likely to downgrade the recommendation when the stock price approaches the 52-week 
high stock price. Furthermore, I also test whether the 52-week low phenomenon is found, 
specifically are analysts more likely to upgrade the recommendation when the stock price 
approaches the 52-week low stock price. There are many academic papers that have found 
significant results with 52-week low phenomenon among investors3, and thus it is worth the 
study. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Li et al. (2016) do not find statistically 
significant results for the 52-week low phenomenon. 
My second research question relates to price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) and its function as an 
anchor for analysts. Does P/E ratio serve as a reference point for analysts when they are revising 
their recommendations, resulting in underreaction to new information? For instance, when the 
P/E ratio of a stock is approaching its historical low points, some market participants often view 
the stock price as cheap, and analysts might believe that the stock has thus more upside potential 
and has become more attractive. This anchoring effect on P/E ratio might lead analysts to revise 
their recommendations close to these potential reference points. Similarly, when P/E ratio is 
approaching historical high points, the company may be perceived overvalued by analysts, 
resulting in analysts downgrading the stock. The effect is essentially similar to anchoring on 
the 52-week high or 52-week low but instead of stock price, the P/E is the main anchor.  
In Figure 1, an example of potential anchoring of 52-week high/low phenomenon is illustrated. 
It shows that an analyst may have anchored his view to both 52-week high and 52-week low 
stock prices as his recommendation revisions are issued when the stock price is approaching 
the 52-week low and 52-week high. Analyst D. Holland downgrades his recommendation when 
the stock price is approaching the 52-week high and upgrades his recommendation back to 
previous level when it is approaching the 52-week low stock price. Moreover, the forward-
looking P/E ratio is also illustrated in Figure 1 and it is noticeable that the forward-looking P/E 
ratio is also approaching the 2-year low P/E ratio at the same time than it is approaching the 52-
week low stock price.  
                                                 
3 See e.g. Brock, Laknishok, and LeBraon (1992), George and Hwang (2004) and Huddars, Lang and Yetman 
(2008). 
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Figure 1. Daily stock price and P/E ratio of General Electric and analysts’ stock 
recommendation revisions 
Figure 1 shows daily stock price and forward looking P/E ratio of General Electric and recommendation revisions 
during the one-year period between October 2010 and September 2011. Only one analyst revises recommendations 
during that period. Analyst D. Holland downgrades his recommendation from Strong buy (5) to Buy (4) in January 
6, 2011 and upgrades it in September 22, 2011 from Buy (4) to Strong buy (5). In the first revision, the stock price 
is approaching the 52-week high stock price when the analyst downgrades the stock and in addition the stock has 
not yet broken through the 52-week high ‘resistance level’. In the latter case, the same analyst upgrades the stock 
back to Strong buy (5) and the stock price is approaching the 52-week low stock price and the P/E ratio is also 
approaching the 2-year low P/E ratio. Furthermore, the stock price and the P/E ratio have not yet broken through 
the 52-week low stock price and 2-year low P/E ‘support levels’, respectively. 
 
The anchoring effect of 52-week high and low phenomenon is similar when P/E works as an 
anchor. Consider the following example. An analyst upgrades his recommendation from Buy 
to Strong buy and justifies his recommendation stating that the median forward-looking P/E 
multiple has dropped close to the 2-year low. However, a few days before his recommendation 
revision, the company announced new information about its weakened growth prospects.  The 
analyst may have performed complex models and extensive analyses about the company but it 
can as well be that the stock price has hit a ‘support level’ in the analyst’s mind and the analyst 
has underreacted to the bad news provided by the company4. The analyst may have anchored 
his view to a certain, higher P/E multiple, leading him to adjust his views only partially. Thus, 
analyst upgrades his recommendation to Strong buy. Similarly, an analyst may see e.g. the 2-
                                                 
4 According to Bradshaw (2011), there is no general consensus whether analysts over- or underreact to 
information. 
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year high P/E multiple as an upper bound for the stock and as a result, the analyst downgrades 
the stock. In other words, the high P/E multiple works as a price barrier in the analyst’s mind 
as he thinks that the stock price has little room to grow and is more likely to fall.  
The main hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Analysts are more likely to downgrade the recommendation when the company’s stock 
price approaches the 52-week high stock price. 
H2: Analysts are less likely to downgrade the recommendation when the company’s stock 
price approaches the 52-week low stock price. 
H3: Analysts are more likely to downgrade the recommendation when the company’s price-
to-earnings multiple approaches the 2-year high price-to-earnings multiple. 
H4: Analysts are less likely to downgrade the recommendation when the company’s price-to-
earnings multiple approaches the 2-year low price-to-earnings multiple. 
Hypotheses 1-2 test the findings of Li et al. (2016) who point out in their working paper that 
the 52-week high stock price plays a significant role in analyst recommendation revisions. They 
find that analysts are more likely to downgrade recommendations when the stock prices 
approach the 52-week high levels. Nevertheless, they do not find statistically significant effect 
for the 52-week low stock price. I hypothesize that analysts are more likely to upgrade the 
recommendation when the company approaches the 52-week low stock price as analysts may 
see the stock price to hit a ‘support level’ so they consider that the stock price cannot go lower 
anymore. Nevertheless, Li et al. (2016) results indicate that the reaction for the 52-week low 
would be to the same direction as in the case of the 52-week high, i.e. when the company’s 
stock price is approaching the 52-week low stock price, analysts would be more likely to 
downgrade the stock rather than upgrade. One explanation why analysts would behave this way 
in these low price points is that instead of underreacting to the news, they overreact. 
Overreaction could indicate that analysts are more momentum chasing in these situations.  
Hypotheses 3-4 extend beyond existing literature, proposing that in addition to the known 
determinants of analyst recommendation revisions, the low (high) reference P/E multiple plays 
a significant role in analyst recommendation revisions. The main reference time period used is 
the 2-year time period but also other time periods are tested, the last 1, 3, 5 and 10 years. On 
top of that, in additional tests the correlations of P/E approach dummies are tested to other 
important market multiple dummies such as PEG ratio, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and EV/Sales. 
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High correlation would indicate that similar results may be obtained by using one or many other 
market multiples, indicating that analysts may not potentially only anchor to historically 
high/low price-to-earnings multiple or 52-week high/low stock price. In robustness checks, 
regression tests are also run with these other market multiples with the 2-year time period. 
1.2 Contribution to existing literature 
There is vast amount of academic literature about analysts and their recommendations. Majority 
of papers focus on examining analyst and firm characteristics, analyst incentives and conflict 
of interests, analyst influence and informativeness of recommendations, momentum strategies 
and potential buy-and-hold returns. Only recently, there have been more studies on the 
behavioral biases that analysts face when making their recommendations. For example, Li et al. 
(2016) find that analysts partly anchor their views on the 52-week high reference point. Similar 
effect for the 52-week low point is not found.  
Academic literature has long evidenced that also professionals suffer from common biases, e.g. 
study of stockbrokers (Staël Von Hosltein, 1972) and study of overconfident investors (Barber 
and Odean, 1999) to cite a few. To some extent people learn to avoid biases but learning is 
often too hard and individuals who consider themselves experts in a particular area may be slow 
to adjust their decision making (For discussion, see Hirshleifer, 2001).  
However, to my best knowledge there is no single study in major academic papers that would 
examine the potential anchoring effects of valuation multiples in the light of analyst stock 
recommendations. This is surprising since analysts often use valuation multiples to evaluate the 
company’s value. Demirakos et al. (2004) find evidence that analysts particularly refer to 
simple P/E multiples to support their stock recommendations. Bradshaw (2002) finds that 
analysts rely less on present value techniques to support their recommendations. The author 
also finds that analysts most often support their recommendations by referring to P/E ratios and 
long-term growth rate forecasts, implying that both P/E ratio and long-term growth ratio are 
used in the recommendation decisions. Bradshaw (2002) concludes that forward-looking PEG 
ratio is an important heuristic used by analysts to convert their earnings forecasts into target 
prices forecasts and recommendations.  
Nevertheless, there might be another explanation for the extensive use of valuation multiples 
by analysts. Analysts may choose to communicate with investors with simple heuristics that 
correlate with analysts’ more complex valuation models. Bradshaw (2002) summarizes that 
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analysts may use other valuation techniques but simply refer to PEG ratio to justify 
recommendations or use models that are correlated with the PEG ratio.  
What makes the topic more interesting, it is empirically studied that valuation multiples may 
be useful in forecasting future stock price changes. Liu et al. (2002) show that multiples based 
on forward earnings explain stock prices better than multiples based on historical earnings. 
Furthermore, Campbell and Shiller (1998) study long-term P/E ratios and find that these ratios 
have been useful in forecasting future stock price changes. However, the findings may just as 
well be the results of coincidence and data mining. Still, these kinds of findings may have 
profound effects on analysts’ decision making, leading analysts to think multiples have 
predictive power.  
All in all, the topic is fascinating since there is no prior research available and analysts often 
justify their recommendations with simple valuation multiples, indicating that they may use 
these valuation multiples to reach their recommendations. Additionally, recommendations are 
forward looking which means that these predictions always include uncertainty. Furthermore, 
not only the recommendations contain an intuitive component but there is always time pressure 
to make recommendations – constantly changing stock prices and limited amount of time 
dedicated to make the recommendations. With bounded rationality and judgment under 
uncertainty, analysts are prone to use simple heuristics not only to communicate with investors 
but also to revise their recommendations.  
1.3 Scope of the study and potential limitations of the study 
The sample consists of 35,270 analyst recommendation revisions from 5,193 analysts for 1,454 
unique US stock-listed companies. My sample consists of recommendation revisions in the 
period of November 1993 until September 2015 since recommendation database is scarce 
before November 1993. My data includes all U.S. stocks with sufficient data available. Earnings 
estimates must be positive and there should be outstanding forward-looking earnings estimates 
in the past three years on a monthly basis in order to be included in the sample. The procedure 
ensures that the stocks are of sufficient interest to investors and makes it possible to calculate 
meaningful, longer term low points of P/E and other valuation ratios. However, the sample may 
bias the results so that it may not be representative of the many firm-years excluded from the 
sample. My sample size is also substantially smaller to Li et al. (2016) because their focus is 
only on the 52-week high and low phenomena and thus they do not use the earnings estimates 
to calculate long-term P/E ratios.  
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This thesis focuses on the effect of P/E ratios derived from consensus earnings estimates. Brown 
et al. (2015) find that existing literature suggests that analysts incorporate other analysts’ 
forecasts and recommendations in their own forecasts and recommendations. However, the 
authors do find contradicting evidence on the use of consensus estimates but the use of analysts’ 
own estimates is left outside of the scope of this thesis. What is more, Bradshaw (2011) finds 
that there is only limited evidence on what analysts do with their own forecasts.  
As analyst recommendations are forward looking, it is most meaningful to look for forward-
looking valuation ratios as well. The results are more likely stronger with forward-looking ratios 
because multiples based on forward earnings explain stock prices better than historical ones 
(See e.g. Liu et al., 2002). Furthermore, this thesis focuses on company-specific valuation 
multiples. Impact of industry-wide ratios is left outside the scope of this thesis.  
1.4 Main findings of the study  
I find that analysts partly anchor their recommendation revisions to the 52-week high and low 
stock prices. Furthermore, analysts may also partly anchor their revisions to the 2-year high and 
low P/E ratios as well as to their own target prices. However, in the case of P/E ratios and target 
prices, the magnitude of the effect is smaller and results are statistically significant only at the 
5 or 10% level when the 52-week high and low phenomena are controlled. My results show 
that analysts tend to downgrade stock recommendations near these reference points. The odds 
of being downgraded by analysts are over 40% higher for stocks approaching the 52-week high 
or low than that for other stocks in the main tests. Thus, the results indicate that the reference 
points based on historical stock prices have a larger effect on the analysts’ recommendation 
revision decisions than reference points based on valuation multiples.  
The findings are partially consistent with prior literature. Li et al. (2016) find similar reaction 
with the 52-week high stock price but they do not find statistical significance for the 52-week 
low reference point. However, academic literature is mixed on the effect of the 52-week low as 
there are also many papers suggesting that 52-week low is an important anchor for investors 
and e.g. George and Hwang (2004) find negative abnormal returns for stocks that trade near the 
52-week low. Furthermore, one could argue that if the 52-week low stock price is an important 
anchor for investors, it is also important for analysts because analysts’ beliefs are seen as a good 
proxy for the beliefs held by investors in general (Bradshaw, 2011). 
My results show that analysts may partly anchor their views on the P/E multiples or PEG ratio 
but similar effects are not found from Enterprise value multiples of EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT or 
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EV/Sales when all controls are included and also the 52-week high and low phenomena are 
controlled. The results are consistent with prior literature which states that analysts often justify 
their recommendations by using P/E or PEG ratios (Bradshaw, 2002). With all control variables 
included, the odds of being downgraded by analysts are 14.8% and 19.6% higher for companies 
when the P/E ratio is approaching the 2-year high and 2-year low P/E, respectively. The 
magnitude is substantial but over two times smaller compared to the 52-week high and low 
phenomena where the odds of being downgraded are over 40% higher in both cases. 
Furthermore, when the company’s P/E ratio is approaching the 2-year low P/E and the stock 
price is approaching the 52-week low stock price, the effect on downgrade is inverse compared 
to earlier results and thus the analyst is more likely to upgrade the recommendation in these 
reference points. One potential explanation is that the combination of low valuation ratios and 
low stock price leads the analyst to think that the stock has hit a ‘support level’ which leads the 
analyst to underreact to company-specific negative earnings news. The analyst may think that 
the stock price cannot continue to drop much further.  
Lastly, it is to be noted that the anchoring effect on the P/E ratio loses statistical significance in 
a robustness check where regressions are run separately for each weekday. The same holds true 
for the two most important control variables that seem to have the greatest effect on downgrades. 
These control variables yield statistically significant results at the 1% level in the main tests. A 
stock’s recent price momentum in the previous weeks (cumulative return between trading days 
t-21 and t-6 before the recommendation revision day t) seem to increase the odds of 
downgrading substantially whereas an increase in the sum of prior six months’ earnings forecast 
revisions (scaled by price) seem to decrease the odds of downgrading substantially. However, 
the anchoring effects near the 52-week high and low stock prices remain statistically significant 
in all robustness checks, indicating that analysts would partly anchor their recommendation 
revisions to these price points and that the findings would not only be outcomes of coincidence 
and data mining.  
1.5 Structure of the paper 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review on key academic 
papers and themes. Chapter 3 describes the data and data gathering methods and possible 
limitations of the data while Chapter 4 discusses the methodology used in this study. Chapter 5 
shows empirical results and includes a discussion of results. Chapter 6 concludes and provides 
suggestions for further research.  
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2. Literature review 
This chapter summarizes prior research in related fields of behavioral finance and analyst stock 
recommendations. Despite the vast amount of literature on analysts, only a small portion of 
studies has focused on the behavioral side of analysts. First section discusses the framework of 
judgment under uncertainty which affects analysts and their decision making. The next sections 
include discussions of relevant psychological biases such anchoring and adjustment, prospect 
theory and investor attention. These theories may partly explain findings on the 52-week high 
and low phenomena. Valuation methods, herding and momentum effects as well as relevant 
analyst stock recommendation literature are discussed in the remaining sections. 
The behavioral finance literature covers a wide range of biases for which investors can be prone 
to. A good review of literature from investor perspective is provided by Hirshleifer (2001). 
Another good overview of psychological biases of investors is provided by Baker and Nofsinger 
(2002). They divide biases into two sections: how investors think (1) and how investors feel (2). 
Table 1 provides an overview of the main biases. 
Table 1. Psychological biases of investors 
This table represents an overview of psychological biases faced by investors as in Baker and Nofsinger (2002). 
Biases are divided into two main sections: how investors think (1) and how investors feel (2). 
How investors think (1) How investors feel (2) 
Representativeness bias Disposition effect 
Cognitive dissonance Attachment bias 
Overconfidence Changing risk preferences 
Reference points and anchoring Social effects on the investor 
Mood and optimism The media 
Familiarity bias Social interaction and investing 
Endowment effect The Internet 
Status quo bias  
Law of small numbers  
Mental accounting  
 
2.1 Analysts’ judgment and decision making under uncertainty 
Due to limited amount of time, information and cognitive abilities, people cannot analyze all of 
the data and options but instead use rule-of-thumbs, heuristics, to simplify decisions (Simon, 
1955). The heuristics that people use are often similar which leads to systematic rather than 
random biases. Experimental psychology has long evidenced systematic biases in situations 
where uncertainty and intuition is involved. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find that the general 
characteristics of judgment under uncertainty are the reliance on heuristics and the presence of 
common biases. One situation where intuition and uncertainty is involved in the judgment is 
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analyst stock recommendations. However, it is worth questioning whether the analysts’ 
intuition is worth the trust? 
Intuitive judgment is sometimes flawed but it can arise from genuine skill. Kahneman and Klein 
(2009) describe two approaches to intuition and expertise: heuristics and biases (HB) and 
naturalistic decision making (NDM). NDM is based on the view that professional judgment can 
be based on skill and expertise and that experts use cues successfully to make their judgments. 
For example, Chase and Simon (1973) show that great chess players can recognize a good move 
without calculating all potential moves. The intuition is based on the recognition of patterns 
stored in memory. In contrast to NDM, the HB approach focuses more on the flaws of intuition 
leading to systematic biases in decision making. Therefore, intuitive judgment arises from 
simplifying heuristics, not from specific experience.  
When it comes to analysts and their judgment, both approaches to intuition and skill are 
appropriate and applicable in some situations. According to Kahneman and Klein (2009), 
skilled intuition can develop in an environment with sufficiently high validity and additionally 
there needs to be suitable opportunity to train the skill. These criteria can be met for example 
in some mergers and acquisitions situations5 which are familiar for the analyst. From early on, 
the analyst using his vast knowledge in the company, industry and earlier transactions may 
often successfully determine rather accurately the valuation range for which the deal would go 
through. The analyst uses his intuition in a situation where the environment is sufficiently 
regular and his intuition is rooted in previous similar experiences.  
Nevertheless, analysts can unlikely develop skilled intuition for stock recommendations. 
Kahneman and Klein (2009) find that professionals with expertise in some specific area may 
unsuccessfully try to apply their skills in other areas of their work where actually a different 
environment exists. Therefore, even though the analyst knows how to use his intuition 
successfully for some purposes, the attempt to use the same knowledge for other purposes may 
misguide him. This is a fallacy that many finance professionals may fall down. Kahneman and 
Klein (2009) discuss that experienced professionals may become overconfident when they 
know a great deal about a particular company and have received good feedback supporting their 
confidence in performing short-term tasks while the feedback from their failures in the long-
                                                 
5 Analysts may face biases in these kinds of familiar mergers and acquisitions situations as well, such as 
anchoring. One anchoring example is described in Section 2.3 Reference points, anchoring and adjustment. 
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term judgments are often delayed, sparse and ambiguous. Additionally, they may make 
judgments that are successful by chance. 
As Kahneman and Klein (2009) put it, to develop skilled intuition requires an environment of 
high validity and opportunity to learn the environment. Predictions of future value of individual 
stocks and long-term stock price performance are almost made in a zero-validity environment, 
assuming efficient markets. This leads to flawed intuitive judgment and use of heuristics to 
simplify decisions. The analyst may have skill to determine the commercial prospects of a firm 
but applying these skills to judge whether a stock is underpriced or overpriced goes beyond 
their skills. One explanation for this kind of behavior is overconfidence which can arise from 
applying expertise to areas where the professional has no real skill or from successful historical 
judgments. 
2.2 Overconfidence and biased self-deception 
Overconfidence and self-deception are related to anchoring and adjustment phenomenon 
observed also among analysts. Self-deception means that individuals are designed to think they 
are better and smarter than they really are (see Daniel et al., 1998). Griffin and Tversky (1992) 
find that professionals tend to be more prone to overconfidence than non-professionals when 
predictability is low and evidence is ambiguous, such as in the case of stock recommendations. 
According to their study, experts with rich models are even more likely to exhibit 
overconfidence.  
Overconfidence is widely recognized phenomenon among experts in the financial markets6. 
One of the reasons is that estimating stock performance is an open-ended question and feedback 
is delayed. It can lead analysts to under- or overweigh information. The theory of 
overconfidence and self-deception would state that the analyst’s confidence grows when public 
information is in agreement with his view but it does not drop considerably when public 
information is in disagreement with his private information. 
There are lots of documented research that individuals tend to credit themselves for past 
successes and blame external factors for failure. Miller and Ross (1975) find that successful 
outcomes result in greater self-attribution of performance than failing or neutral outcomes. 
Taylor and Brown (1988) summarize psychological literature and discuss the findings that 
individuals have overly positive views of themselves, excessive belief in their ability to control 
                                                 
6 See e.g. Odean (1998) for discussion of the overconfidence of traders. 
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their environment and a view that their future is far better than the average person’s. Langer 
and Roth (1975) study purely chance-based tasks and find that the group with early successes 
in coin tosses increased their evaluation of past performance, over-remembering it. The people 
in this group tended to keep themselves significantly better at predicting future outcomes of 
coin tosses compared to other groups.  
2.3 Reference points, anchoring and adjustment 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) refer to anchoring when people make estimates by starting from 
an initial value which is then adjusted to yield the final answer. However, they find that these 
adjustments are usually insufficient and different starting points yield different estimates which 
are biased towards the initial values. In other words, the initial value carries an unreasonably 
high weight in the person’s decision-making process. In the stock market, anchoring can mean 
for e.g. locking your view into a reference point such as purchase price, specific historical stock 
price or relative metrics such as P/E ratio. 
Reference points play a significant role in people’s decision making even though these price 
points are often irrelevant numbers. 52-week high stock price is one of most widely documented 
reference point. George and Hwang (2004) find evidence that 52-week high serves as a 
reference point for investors. They find underreactions in stock prices when stock prices are 
approaching 52-week high even if stocks have had very high past returns.  
Baker et al. (2012) find that reference points play a critical role in mergers and acquisitions. 
They find that prior stock price peaks, such as 52-week high, affect several aspects of merger 
and acquisition activity and pricing. Value estimations for the company may be anchored to 
companies that are viewed similar and bias the sample that comes to mind. The same can 
happen for stock market analysts. For example, when an analyst is following Google, his 
recommendation revisions may be anchored mainly to the changes in stock prices and 
price/enterprise multiples of Microsoft and Apple. The analyst may view Google similar to 
these two other companies as they are both in the same high-tech industry and thus when 
estimating future stock price of Google, the sample that comes to analyst’s mind may only 
include these two other companies even though there could be several other important peers 
from different industries for instance.    
In the context of analyst stock recommendations, a reference point can be past stock price such 
as historical high or relative metrics such as price-to-earnings ratio. A reference point formation 
can happen for example when there is an unexpected earnings announcement. This should lead 
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analysts to adjust their recommendations to fully reflect the new information. However, as the 
analyst has anchored his view on a reference point, the adjustment does not fully reflect the 
new information and adjustment is insufficient. Li et al. (2016) find evidence that 52-week high 
stock price may serve as a reference point for analysts.  
Another anchoring definition is by Chapman and Johnson (1999) who state that anchoring is a 
pervasive judgment bias where decision makers are systematically influenced by random and 
uninformative starting points. They summarize plenty of anchoring literature and find that 
anchoring effect has been widely found in studies of judgment such as pricing and rating of 
simple gambles, estimation of probabilities and answers to factual knowledge questions. 
Furthermore, anchoring is also present in e.g. false consensus effects and predictions of future 
performance. Chapman and Johnson (1999) study anchoring as activation and find that anchor 
biases the information used in the target evaluation because it leads activation of selective target 
information that is consistent with the anchor. They find that anchoring effect is reduced when 
subjects are prompted to consider features of the item that are different from the anchor while 
prompting subjects to consider similar effects to anchor has no effect.  
Prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) finds that gains and losses are evaluated 
relative to a reference point and that investors have extra aversion to losses at the reference 
point. Value function is convex for losses and concave for gains and investors tend to 
overweight low probability events. Hirshleifer (2001) describes loss aversion as a phenomenon 
in which people tend to be averse to even to very small risks relative to a reference point. 
Kaustia (2010) shows that prospect theory unlikely explains the disposition effect. Disposition 
effect means that people are more willing to recognize gains than losses. 
Barber and Odean (2008) discuss the investor attention hypothesis which states that investors 
focus on the information that have caught their attention. According to Barber and Odean 
(2008), individual investors have limited capabilities to follow all stocks and thus they focus 
on a subset of stocks that grab their attention. Yuan (2015) finds that market-wide attention 
affects individual investors’ trading behavior. Yuan (2015) shows that high market attention 
leads individual investors in aggregate to reduce their stock positions substantially when the 
market index is high and modestly to increase when the market index is low.  
2.4 Momentum strategies and 52-week high/low as reference points 
Momentum strategies take advantage of investor underreactions and stock prices fail to adjust 
adequately (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that momentum 
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strategies of buying stocks with good past performance and selling stocks with poor past 
performance generate significant positive returns over 3- to 12-month holding periods. There 
is also empirical evidence that momentum strategies based on analyst stock recommendations 
are working. Barber et al. (2001) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find significant profits from 
calendar timing trading strategies based on the level of analysts’ recommendations. Trading 
strategies based on purchasing the most recommended quintile of stocks and sell the least 
recommended quintile of stocks generate abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that price and earnings momentum are correlated with 
recommendation levels but that recommendation revisions based strategies are not driven by 
momentum or any other stock characteristics. Nevertheless, Barber et al. (2010) find that 
methods of Jegadeesh et al. (2004) do not fully capture the value of analyst recommendations. 
They provide evidence that both rating levels and rating changes have incremental predictive 
power for security returns. 
Barber et al. (2010) show that superior returns are yielded with hedge strategies of buying single 
(double) upgrades to buy or strong buy and shorting those receiving single (double) downgrades 
to sell or strong sell. These returns are superior to the strategies of change only (buying all 
single upgrades and shorting all single downgrades) and levels only (buying all buys and strong 
buys and shorting all sells and strong sells). When analyzing the effect of firm size, small stocks 
dominate the returns and no evidence of superior returns are found with large cap stocks. 
George and Hwang (2004) find that 52-week high stock price explains partly the profits from 
momentum based investment strategies. Their results suggest that 52-week high stock price has 
predictive power even if individual stocks have had high past returns. Investors also seem to 
anchor to the 52-week high when evaluating the potential impact of news. George et al. (2015) 
show that investors anchor their beliefs on the 52-week high stock price which restrains price 
reactions to earnings news close to the 52-week high. They find that the post earnings 
announcement drift is dependent on the 52-week high when earnings surprises arrive. In 
addition, Li et al. (2016) find positive abnormal returns on taking a long position on stocks 
approaching the 52-week high stock price.  
Many studies have examined momentum strategies of 52-week low and find positive abnormal 
returns. Huddart, Lang, and Yetman (2009) find that hitting the 52-week low generates positive 
abnormal returns. George and Hwang (2004) find negative abnormal returns for stocks trading 
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close to their 52-week low stock price. Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) show that 
hitting the past 200-day low stock index generates negative abnormal returns.  
2.5 Valuation multiples used by analysts 
Gleason et al. (2013) discuss that stock valuation methods can be divided into two categories: 
fundamental valuation models such as discounted cash flow method and relative valuation 
models such as P/E multiples and P/B multiples which are compared to historical norms or 
other companies in the same industry. According to Gleason et al. (2013) these valuation 
multiples are derived from informal methods and experience and are easy to apply and 
communicate which is in line with e.g. Bradshaw (2002) and Liu et al. (2001). Furthermore, 
Bradshaw (2004) finds that residual income models are unrelated or negatively related to 
recommendations whereas PEG ratio is positively related to recommendations.  
Analysts regularly use and cite valuation multiples. Demirakos et al. (2004) find evidence that 
analysts most often refer to P/E multiples to support their stock recommendations. Bradshaw 
(2002) finds that analysts rely less on present value techniques to support their 
recommendations. The author finds that analysts most often justify their recommendations with 
references to P/E multiples and long-term growth rates, indicating that both ratios are 
supporting the analyst’s recommendation or valuation decision. Bradshaw (2002) concludes 
that forward-looking PEG ratio is an important heuristic used by analysts to convert their 
earnings forecasts into target prices forecasts and recommendations.  
Demirakos et al. (2004) examined 103 analyst reports and find that 67% of analysts use 
valuation multiples while discounted cash flow model is used by 16% of analysts and residual 
income models by 10% of analysts and other approaches by 7% of analysts. Pinto et al. (2015) 
provide a summary of previous survey-based studies on equity valuation. Pinto et al. (2015) 
find that in Americas 92.6% of the survey respondents use a market multiples approach for 
valuation which is clearly the most common method in their survey. Ranking second and third 
are discounted cash flow model (73.9%) and asset-based approaches (59.5%). Pinto et al. (2015) 
show that among those who use market multiples in the Americas, the most popular multiples 
are the P/E (87%) and enterprise value multiples (76%). Furthermore, Barniv et al. (2010) show 
that stock recommendations correlate negatively to residual income valuation estimates but 
positively to valuation heuristics based on the PEG ratio and long-term growth rate. 
Liu et al. (2001) study the most commonly used multiples and find that multiples based on 
forward earnings explain stock prices the best and are more value-relevant compared to 
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historical earnings measures, cash flow measures and book value and sales measures. Moreover, 
results of Wu (2014) with forward P/E ratio are consistent with Liu et al. (2001). Wu (2014) 
also summarizes well the crucial role of P/E ratio in the investment community: P/E ratio 
reflects the market expectations of future growth and firm risk and it can be used to estimate 
cost of equity and earn excess stock returns from glamour/value anomaly.  
2.6 Abnormal returns and analyst stock recommendations  
There is vast amount of academic literature on analyst stock recommendations and plenty of 
evidence that abnormal returns can be made by following analyst stock recommendations in the 
US stock market, indicating that stock recommendations have informational value. In one of 
the most cited papers, Womack (1996) finds that returns in the three-day recommendation 
period are large and in the direction forecast by the analysts. The results go in line with the 
expanded view of market efficiency proposed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). They suggest 
that returns are required due to information search costs.  
On the other hand, the empirical results may be in contradiction with the foundation of modern 
financial theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis, proposed by Malkiel and Fama (1970). It 
states that in efficient markets stock prices reflect all available information. In the semi-strong 
form of market efficiency, prices reflect all publicly available historical and current information 
and thus there should not be excess returns to be made by following analyst stock 
recommendations since the information is already reflected in the stock prices. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that all these empirical studies on abnormal returns are always open 
to criticism since it may be that the expected return benchmark used in measuring abnormal 
returns may be misspecified as discussed by Fama (1998). 
Majority of research has focused on studying when the recommendations are most powerful. 
Stickel (1995) finds that recommendation upgrades tend to outperform downgrades. 
Furthermore, changes in recommendations that skip a rank have a greater price effect than 
changes in recommendations that do not skip a rank. Also, larger brokerage houses have more 
impact on prices than do smaller brokers, which is consistent with larger houses having stronger 
marketing staff. Boni and Womack (2006) as well as Green (2006) document that stocks that 
are most favorably recommended outperform the stocks with the least favorable 
recommendations.  
Barber et al. (2010) provide evidence that abnormal returns can be made when analysts’ 
recommendation rating levels and rating changes are followed. They conclude that investing 
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based on both levels and changes has the potential to outperform one based exclusively on one 
or the other. Furthermore, they find that recommendation levels and revisions may help forecast 
future unexpected earnings and resulting market reactions. 
Analyst characteristics are also extensively studied. Loh and Stulz (2011) examine influential 
recommendation changes in terms of visible stock price impact. They find that recommendation 
changes are more likely to be influential if they are from leader, star, previously influential 
analysts, issued away from consensus, accompanied by earnings forecasts, and issued on 
growth, small, high institutional ownership or high forecast dispersion firms.  
Boni and Womack (2006) examine value of analysts as industry specialists. They show that 
analysts create value in their recommendations mainly through their ability to rank stocks 
within industries. They suggest that aggregate recommendations of any firm that provides 
research coverage that is widely diversified across industries should be expected to outperform 
those of any firm that covers only a few industries. They conclude that recommendation 
information is quite valuable for identifying short-term within industry mispricing but this same 
information aggregated by industry is not of obvious value in projecting future relative returns 
across industries. 
It is also shown that the reactions are largest in the US stock market. Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) 
show that stock prices react significantly to recommendation revision in G7 countries except 
Italy. They document the largest price reactions around the recommendation revisions and post-
revision price drift in the US. They conclude that most likely explanation to superior 
performance in the US market is that analysts in the US market are more skilled at identifying 
mispriced stocks than their foreign counterparts. Their explanation for this is that salaries are 
highest among US analysts which could indicate that US analysts are most skillful and thus 
explain the strongest market reactions. 
2.7 Selection bias, herding and incentives in analyst stock recommendations 
Selection bias is present in analyst recommendations. Womack (1996) finds that 
recommendations are mainly issued on well-followed large capitalization stocks. Boni and 
Womack (2003) find that growth stocks are valued over value stocks. Loh and Mian (2006) 
document that analysts prefer glamour stocks. They find that stocks that are given higher 
recommendations tend to have positive momentum and high trading volume. They also exhibit 
greater past sales growth and are expected to grow their earnings faster in the future. These 
stocks also tend to have higher valuation multiples, more positive accounting accruals, and 
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capital expenditures constitute a greater proportion of their total assets. Loh and Mian’s results 
also hint that analysts could improve their stock recommendations if they paid more attention 
to the relation between stock characteristics and future returns. 
There is also a plenty of discussion of potential conflicts of interests of analysts. According to 
Barniv et al. (2010), analysts in the research department who provide stock recommendations 
may feel pressure from the investment banking division to provide favorable reports because 
unfavorable reports may reduce investment-banking business of the brokerage firm. According 
to the authors that is one of the reasons why SEC accepted new regulations in the US in 2002 
to limit interactions and flow of information between these two departments.  Brown et al. (2015) 
provide good insights into incentives analysts face by surveying 365 analysts covering a wide 
range of topics. They find for example that industry knowledge is an important factor to 
determine analysts’ compensation. In addition, generating underwriting business and trading 
commissions continues to be an important part of compensations for many analysts. This is in 
line with Michaely and Womack (1999) who report significant evidence of recommendation 
bias of underwriter analysts. They show that the stock performs better when it receives a buy 
recommendation from an unaffiliated broker and worse when the stock is recommended by 
underwriter analysts.  
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) discuss the herding effects among analysts. They show that analysts 
herd near the consensus when they issue stock recommendations. Results indicate that the 
market recognizes analysts’ tendency to herd since the stock price reactions are stronger when 
the new recommendation is issued away from the consensus than when it is closer to it. Booth 
et al. (2014) study who lead the herd in stock recommendations. They find that 
recommendations are more likely to affect the direction of consensus in the following 
conditions: they are issued by lead analysts accompanied by concurrent earnings forecast that 
are in the same direction from the same analysts, away from the consensus, followed by price 
momentum, issued on large and high-growth firms and issued by analysts from large brokers 
with less frequent recommendations. Furthermore, market reactions are stronger for the 
recommendations of lead analysts than others. 
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3. Data 
This chapter describes the data, goes through data gathering process and possible limitations of 
the data. IBES, CRSP and Compustat data are retrieved via Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). First section describes the IBES data gathering process. Second section discusses the 
CRSP stock exchange data and Compustat accounting data gathering processes. Third section 
provides an overview how these databases are combined and fourth section shows descriptive 
statistics of the data. In the last section of this chapter, possible limitations of the study are 
discussed. 
3.1 Analyst stock recommendations and forecasts from IBES 
Analyst stock recommendations were gathered from IBES database. IBES recommendation 
data is scarce and incomplete before November 1993 (see e.g. Demiroglu and Ryngaert, 2010) 
which is why data before November 1993 is not used. This study focuses solely on US 
companies listed in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges. To ensure data validity, 
observations with missing analyst name or masked analyst code were removed. Stale 
recommendations were removed, i.e. recommendations that are older than one year, specifically 
if the IBES review date is over one year later than the announcement date. Review date is the 
most recent date on which IBES verified that a particular recommendation was still valid by 
calling the analyst. If the analyst confirms that a previous recommendation is valid, the original 
database record for that recommendation is retained and only the review date variable updated 
(Booth et al., 2014). Recommendations that have review date or activation date before 
announcement date were removed. Recommendations dated between 2.9.2002-10.9.2002 were 
removed due to changes in recommendation categories (Kadan et al. 2012, Loh & Stulz 2011).  
Bradley et al. (2014) point out that recommendations’ timestamps in IBES are delayed by 
approximately 2.4 hours although the majority of recommendations with delayed 
announcement times occur before the market opens. After correcting for timestamp delays, they 
find significant intraday market reactions to the recommendations. As I have no access to the 
newswires to compare the actual timestamp to the IBES recorded one, I have no possibility to 
separate the recommendations that are actually announced at trading hours and which are not. 
Thus, in my study recommendations that occur after trading hours are interpreted as if the event 
day had occurred that day.  
If multiple recommendations are issued by the same analyst to the same company on one day, 
only the latest record is kept. If multiple analyst recommendations are given on the same day 
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for the same company, potential herding effect is controlled by using Analyst herding dummy 
defined in Table 5. Multiple academic studies have found herding among analysts. For 
discussion of herding effects among analysts, see e.g. Jegadeesh and Kim (2010).  
Recommendation levels are reversed to help interpretations so that Strong buy recommendation 
corresponds 5, Buy to 4, Hold to 3, Underperform to 2 and Sell to 1. After the reversion, 
recommendation upgrade corresponds to a positive value and recommendation downgrade a 
negative one. Reiterations and initial recommendations are removed from the sample, which is 
one commonly used approach by researchers. Also Li et al. (2016) test their results excluding 
reiterations and initial recommendations. 
I use IBES summary statistics file to find the companies that analysts have followed and given 
EPS forecasts for next and current fiscal year. The dataset includes one observation per month 
for each company. Each observation includes the median and mean estimates based on all the 
analysts that have outstanding estimates for the company in question in the past month. When 
the announcement date of the actual is missing, data is excluded from the sample. Furthermore, 
companies with less than 5 years of earnings estimates are dropped as I need to calculate longer-
term price-to-earnings ratios. Furthermore, consecutive three years of positive median EPS 
estimates are required to be included in the sample. That means that in the recommendation 
revision month, there needs to be at least three years of consecutive positive monthly EPS 
estimates to calculate meaningful 3-year low and high P/E ratios and thus approach dummies.  
3.2 Stock exchange data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat 
Stock exchange data is retrieved from CRSP database. Share code must be 10 or 11 implying 
common shares. In addition, exchange code must be 1, 2 or 3, indicating NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stock exchanges, respectively. Market capitalization on day t is calculated as 
common shares on day t multiplied by the closing price on day t. Observations with missing 
market capitalization are dropped. Price and share data is adjusted for stock distributions.  
Accounting data is retrieved from Compustat Annual Update. Below, Table 2 describes the data 
variables collected. The control variables used in this study are further defined in Chapter 4. 
For each observation, the most recent Compustat data available is used which is based on the 
reported quarterly/annual earnings announcement dates. The data is considered available for 
analysts based on the announcement dates reported in Compustat database.  
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Table 2. Compustat accounting data 
This table shows the main variables retrieved from the Compustat database, including both quarterly and annual 
data. 
Variable Frequency Definition 
ebitda Annual Annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
ebit Annual Annual earnings before interest and taxes 
revt Annual Annual sales 
at Annual Total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
epsfx Annual Annual earnings before extraordinary items, diluted 
capxq Quarterly Quarterly capital expenditure 
saleq Quarterly Quarterly sales 
dlttq Quarterly Total long-term debt at the end of the quarter 
dlcq Quarterly Debt in current liabilities at the end of the quarter 
mibq Quarterly Noncontrolling interest, redeemable, balance sheet 
pstkq Quarterly Total preferred/preference stock capital 
cheq Quarterly Cash and short-term investments 
atq Quarterly Assets at the end of the quarter 
ceqq Quarterly Total common/ordinary equity 
epsfx Quarterly Earnings before extraordinary items, diluted 
actq Quarterly Current assets, total 
lctq Quarterly Current liabilities, total 
oancfy Quarterly Net cash flow from operating activities 
ibq Quarterly Income before extraordinary items 
txpq Quarterly Income taxes payable 
dpq Quarterly Depreciation and amortization expense 
 
3.3 Linking databases 
To link CRSP stock data and IBES analyst forecast and recommendation data, I use commonly 
used CUSIP method to link company tickers (IBES tickers and CRSP PERMNOs). IBES uses 
historical CUSIPs and CRSP the most recent one so to link the companies, the latest CUSIP for 
each company are obtained from the IBES database.  
Linking by CUSIP is very effective as it produces a large number of potentially accurate 
matches according to WRDS.7 This is because CUSIPs are not reused over time, i.e. the CUSIP 
code is not assigned to other companies after original company is delisted for instance. Thus, 
linking with CUSIP is not expected to yield many inaccurate matches. WRDS tested this 
method and they were able to link 94% of US companies in the IBES database as of April 2006 
(14,591 links).  
WRDS has created a ‘CCM’ linking table (CRSP/Compustat Merged Database) to combine 
CRSP and Compustat data using CRSP’s PERMNO or PERMCO codes or using Compustat’s 
main identifier GVKEY. Although linking is highly accurate, it is not complete or entirely 
                                                 
7 Linking IBES and CRSP Data via webpage https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_010 
Linking%20Databases/_000Linking%20IBES%20and%20CRSP%20Data.cfm. Accessed 15.09.2016 (requires 
log-in). See the page also for alternative methods to create IBES-CRSP links. 
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unambiguous according to WRDS 8 . For instance, the match between Compustat’s main 
identifier, GVKEY and CRSP’s PERMNO is not one-to-one because a company might have 
multiple equity issues and thus a single GVKEY links to all the associated equity issues. Only 
those observations with research complete (link type code = LC) and unresearched link to issue 
by CRSP (LU) are used in the CCM linking table. The latter link is established by comparing 
the Compustat and historical CRSP CUSIPs. WRDS refers to these links as primary. Other link 
types are either irrelevant for this study (ETFs, indices) or not verified (secondary link types), 
and thus are excluded. I use the PERMNO company list to retrieve all the associated GVKEYs 
from the CCM linking table. 
For the 10,612 unique permno codes in the IBES/CRSP dataset, CCM linking table retrieves 
10,781 unique PERMNO - CUSIP and 10,781 unique PERMNO - GVKEY pairs. This means 
that the there are multiple occassions where one PERMNO links to multiple GVKEYS or 
multiple CUSIP codes. Thus to match correctly IBES/CRSP dataset with Compustat, I use both 
PERMNO and most recent CUSIP codes in order to obtain Compustat main identifier GVKEY 
to my dataset. The most recent 9-digit CUSIP code obtained from the CCM file is translated to 
8-digit. In the merged file, there are 10,193 unique permno codes left, which means that the 
matching succeeded for 96% of the companies with this method. 
When retrieving additional data, the permanent identifiers in each of these databases are used, 
i.e. PERMNO codes for CRSP data, GVKEYs for Compustat data and IBES ticker for IBES 
data. Before combining stock price data, accounting data or analyst forecast data, there are 
216,511 recommendation revisions in the recommendation dataset with combined identifiers to 
all three databases. Nevertheless, the sample set becomes substantially smaller after applying 
the limitations for the data. The analyst forecast data is the main limiting factor of the sample 
as positive EPS forecasts are required on a monthly basis. 
3.4 Description of data 
The sample consists of 35,270 analyst recommendation revisions from 5,193 analysts for 1,454 
unique companies during the period from November 1993 to September 2015. Table 3 provides 
description of summary statistics and Table 4 shows correlations between the most important 
variables.  
                                                 
8 CCM Overview of CRSP/Compustat Merged Database via website https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
research/applications/linking/CRSP_COMPUSTAT_merged/index.cfm. Accessed 20.9.2016 (requires log-in). 
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Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviation, median and number of observations in the full 
sample. There are 35,270 recommendation revisions with a mean prior rating of 3.583. Li et al. 
(2016) full sample includes 214,691 recommendation revisions including reiterations with a 
mean prior rating of 3.570 which is close to my sample. My sample does not include reiterations 
and their corresponding subsample includes 121,158 revisions excluding reiterations. However, 
summary statistics from their subsample are not available. The inclusion of reiterations mainly 
explains the difference in the mean of downgrades that is 0.530 in my sample and 0.413 in Li 
et al. (2016) sample. Table 4 shows that there is statistically significant correlation between 
most of the variables and it is noticeable that correlation between Coverage and Size is high 
(0.704). However, majority of variables show correlation which is rather low between -0.1 and 
0.1. This is in line with Li et al. (2016) dataset. 
Other summary statistics seem to be robust with Li et al. (2016) as well. However, majority of 
my variables are tilted upwards compared to Li et al. (2016) due to excluding negative P/E 
ratios from my sample and reiterations. Furthermore, my sample includes only observations 
that have had three years of consecutive earnings estimates on a monthly basis given by analysts 
to ensure sufficient interest of analysts and investors and to calculate longer term P/E ratios on 
a daily basis. As a result, for instance variables Size, Turnover, Analyst Coverage and Firm age 
of the companies in my sample are much higher compared to Li et al. (2016).  
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 35,270 analyst recommendation revisions from 5,193 analysts for 1,454 unique companies 
in the period from November 1993 to September 2015. Recommendations range from 1 to 5, indicating sell, 
underperform, hold, buy and strong buy respectively. Recommendation revision is the current rating minus the 
prior rating for the firm by the same analyst. Downgrade equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for 
upgrades. Approach variables are dummies that equal 1 when the measure is 5% below (above) the high (low) 
value at day t-1 and 0 otherwise. For instance, specifically approach 52-week high stock price is 1 if (1-0.05) x 
52-week high < price at t-1 < 52-week high and 0 otherwise. Other variables are defined in detail in Table 5 except 
firm age. Firm age is the recommendation announcement year minus the first year that the firm appears in CRSP 
plus one year. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles to eliminate outliers similarly 
to Jegadeesh et al. (2004).  
  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Q1 Median Q3 N 
Prior rating 3.583 1.016 3 4 4 35,270 
Recommendation revision -0.091 1.485 -1 -1 1 35,270 
Downgrade 0.530 0.499 0 1 1 35,270 
Approach 52-week high stock price 0.152 0.359 0 0 0 35,270 
Approach 52-week low stock price 0.054 0.225 0 0 0 35,270 
Approach 2-year high P/E ratio 0.050 0.217 0 0 0 35,270 
Approach 2-year low P/E ratio 0.036 0.185 0 0 0 35,270 
Price/52-week high 0.812 0.177 0.717 0.859 0.952 28,370 
Price/52-week low 1.403 0.455 1.137 1.294 1.527 28,370 
P/E 25.165 46.158 9.133 15.235 24.193 35,242 
Forward-looking P/E ratio 16.597 9.146 11.298 14.549 19.198 35,270 
Returnt-5, t-1 0.000 0.062 -0.030 0.001 0.031 34,761 
Returnt-21, t-6 0.003 0.099 -0.049 0.006 0.055 34,322 
Returnm-6, m-2 0.047 0.250 -0.097 0.037 0.173 31,990 
Returnm-12, m-7 0.075 0.270 -0.084 0.055 0.202 30,555 
Forecast revisions 0.000 0.019 -0.003 0.002 0.008 30,977 
SUE 1.273 1.530 0.377 1.138 2.052 34,542 
Size 22.102 1.694 20.847 22.105 23.313 34,300 
B/M 0.451 0.332 0.238 0.375 0.573 34,926 
Turnover 8.826 9.683 2.657 5.843 11.472 34,074 
Accruals 0.007 0.051 -0.019 0.004 0.029 23,120 
Capex 0.068 0.059 0.026 0.052 0.091 33,017 
Sales growth 1.144 0.218 1.028 1.104 1.216 35,087 
LTG 14.920 7.067 10 14 18 34,351 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.021 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.026 35,268 
Institutional ownership 0.596 0.280 0.357 0.643 0.833 35,270 
Analyst coverage 16.663 9.246 9 16 23 35,270 
Analyst dispersion 0.144 0.193 0.040 0.080 0.160 35,182 
Analyst experience 4.464 4.401 1 3 6 34,848 
Firm age 26.807 20.655 11 20 36 35,270 
 
25 
 
Table 4. Pearson correlation matrix 
Table 4 shows Pearson correlation matrix. Correlations that are statistically significant at the 5% level or less are in bold. Downgrade equals 1 for recommendation downgrades 
and 0 for upgrades. Approach52 equals 1 when stock price is approaching 52-week high stock price, Approach52low equals 1 when stock price is approaching the 52-week low 
stock price, Approach02 equals 1 when forward-looking P/E for the next financial year is approaching the 2-year high and Approach02low equals 1 when forward-looking P/E 
for the next fiscal year is approaching the 2-year low. Otherwise these dummies equal to 0. Other variables are defined in detail in Table 5. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
Downgrade (1)
Approach52 (2) 0.054
Approach52low (3) 0.024 -0.101
Approach02 (4) 0.020 0.349 -0.045
Approach02low (5) 0.002 -0.073 0.369 -0.03
Returnt-5, t-1 (6) 0.006 0.142 -0.133 0.071 -0.082
Returnt-21, t-6 (7) 0.089 0.181 -0.150 0.078 -0.087 0.075
Returnm-6, m-2 (8) -0.039 0.218 -0.155 0.074 -0.069 0.014 0.014
Returnm-12, m-7 (9) -0.023 0.050 -0.059 0.031 -0.028 -0.017 -0.026 -0.027
Forecast revisions (10) -0.059 0.127 -0.099 -0.02 0.034 0.033 0.067 0.391 0.211
SUE (11) 0.007 0.009 -0.011 -0.009 0.010 -0.023 -0.008 0.033 0.118 0.066
Size (12) -0.027 0.100 0.023 0.062 0.053 -0.017 -0.020 0.047 0.005 0.074 0.033
B/M (13) 0.033 -0.115 0.066 -0.05 0.012 -0.078 -0.129 -0.258 -0.194 -0.338 -0.125 -0.293
P/E (14) -0.005 -0.041 -0.040 -0.02 -0.017 0.027 0.020 0.100 0.081 0.068 -0.020 0.012 -0.099
Forward P/E ratio (15) -0.022 0.053 -0.084 0.064 -0.071 0.109 0.129 0.223 0.156 -0.033 0.051 0.071 -0.369 0.319
Turnover (16) 0.022 -0.126 0.016 -0.06 0.000 -0.040 -0.070 -0.116 0.003 -0.161 0.178 -0.045 0.045 0.325 0.086
Accruals (17) 0.014 -0.056 0.028 -0.02 0.013 -0.048 -0.035 -0.095 0.021 -0.055 0.024 -0.110 0.027 -0.005 -0.050 0.035
Capex (18) -0.001 -0.042 -0.003 -0.01 -0.017 -0.007 -0.015 -0.023 0.013 -0.059 -0.060 -0.044 -0.073 -0.039 0.029 -0.008 0.005
Sales growth (19) 0.010 -0.036 -0.026 -0.04 0.002 -0.014 -0.011 0.040 0.210 0.086 0.133 -0.084 -0.122 0.125 0.097 0.171 0.113 0.155
LTG (20) 0.012 -0.088 -0.054 -0.06 -0.026 -0.022 -0.012 0.077 0.193 0.065 0.146 -0.178 -0.262 0.244 0.382 0.261 0.071 0.145 0.398
Inst. ownership (21) 0.014 -0.060 0.020 -0.03 0.015 -0.032 -0.046 -0.082 -0.073 -0.089 0.123 0.043 0.066 0.216 0.027 0.336 -0.008 -0.156 -0.029 0.025
Coverage (22) -0.023 0.049 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.010 0.016 -0.011 -0.013 0.004 0.010 0.704 -0.180 0.010 0.058 0.066 -0.074 0.182 0.005 -0.045 -0.005
Dispersion (23) -0.002 -0.055 0.015 -0.03 -0.003 -0.011 -0.028 -0.088 -0.064 -0.192 -0.001 0.179 0.194 0.130 -0.151 0.366 -0.002 0.106 0.048 -0.089 0.286 0.178
Experience (24) -0.018 0.035 0.005 0.039 0.007 0.010 0.006 -0.009 -0.035 0.007 -0.049 0.221 0.015 -0.053 -0.083 -0.080 -0.044 -0.027 -0.129 -0.192 0.005 0.123 0.058
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3.5 Possible limitations of data 
There are a few limitations of data. Positive values for analysts’ earnings and growth forecasts 
are required which means that results may not be representative of the many firm-years 
excluded from the sample. Furthermore, the methods analysts use may vary substantially, and 
the regression results are based on averages, which means that there might be many analysts 
whose recommendations are not biased by anchoring heuristics. When it comes to analyst 
characteristics, star analysts are not taken into account since star analyst data is not accessible 
for the whole sample period. 
Furthermore, impact of industry-wide ratios is left outside of the scope. For instance, analysts 
may potentially anchor to industry P/E ratios. However, it would be difficult to study industry 
multiples since comparable firms would be selected in a mechanical way in academic studies 
while each analyst may use his/her own unique peer group as comparable firms. Thus, results 
would more likely to be weaker and less significant because situation-specific factors are not 
considered by researchers.   
In addition, my study assumes that analysts form the views for their recommendations based 
on consensus earnings estimates rather than their own estimates. This is based on rationale that 
analysts benchmark their own earnings estimates to other estimates and take into account that 
market consensus is right on average which is also the basis for the efficient market hypothesis. 
Bradshaw (2011) concludes that there is only limited evidence on what analysts do with their 
own forecasts. Brown et al. (2015) find that existing literature suggest that analyst incorporate 
other analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations into their own forecasts and 
recommendations. However, their own results contradict with the prior findings suggesting that 
analysts do not incorporate other analysts’ forecasts. Nevertheless, anchoring on own estimates 
is left outside of the scope but it would be an interesting topic for further research to see, whether 
analysts anchor their recommendation revisions to P/E ratios derived from their own earnings 
forecasts.  
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4. Methods 
This chapter describes the methodologies used in this study. In addition, variables used in 
regressions are defined in detail. 
4.1 Regression tests 
Regression tests are similar to Li et al. (2016) who analyze the predictability of anchoring 
effects on the 52-week high stock price. Logit regressions for downgrades are run as follows: 
 
where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. In Equation 1, 
dependent variable is Downgrade which equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for 
upgrades. Approach variable is a dummy which tests the anchoring effect on e.g. 52-week high 
stock price. In case of 52-week high, Approach is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day 
t-1 for stock j is within 5% below the 52-week high stock price. Valuation multiples and 
approach multiples are further defined in Section 4.2. 
Vector X includes a set of control variables that are relevant. The detailed definitions of control 
variables are provided in Table 5. Furthermore, industry (based on 10 main SIC codes) and year 
fixed effects are controlled. Accruals, B/M, capital expenditure, earnings forecast revisions, 
long-term growth forecast, sales growth, SUE and turnover are calculated similarly to 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004), and the rest of the variables are calculated similarly to Li et al. (2016) 
except analyst experience. Analyst experience control variable tries to capture the analyst’s 
experience from a different angle. It takes into account if the analyst has given any EPS 
forecasts at the time of revising his recommendation for the company in question. If the analyst 
has not yet made any earnings estimates, he may be more likely to use consensus earnings 
estimates for his P/E calculations, for instance. 
  
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  (1) 
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Table 5. Control variables 
This table defines the control variables used in regressions in Chapter 5.  
 
My tests are similar to Li et al. (2016) which is why a similar control variable set is appropriate. 
Li et al. (2016) uses control variables that have known correlation with analyst stock 
recommendations. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) further discusses the most important known variables 
that have demonstrated ability to predict cross-sectional returns and why analyst 
recommendations are also correlated with these variables. The authors state that analysts may 
Variable Definition 
Accruals Total accruals divided by total assets on a quarterly basis. The change in non-cash current 
assets minus the change in current liabilities, excluding the change in debt included in current 
liabilities and the change in income taxes payable minus depreciation and amortization 
expense, divided by average total assets 
Analyst coverage The number of analysts providing one-year earnings forecasts in prior three months (divided 
by 100 in regressions) 
Analyst dispersion Standard deviation across earnings forecasts in the prior three months from IBES summary 
detail file  
Analyst 
experience 
Natural logarithm of recommendation revision year subtracted by number of years plus one 
year since the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the firm in question. Negative values are 
replaced by 0. 
Analyst herding Dummy that equals 1 if multiple recommendation revisions are issued at the same day for the 
same company 
B/M Book value of equity divided by market value of equity 
Capex Rolling sum of capital expenditure in the previous four quarters divided by the average total 
assets 
Forecast revisions Rolling sum of previous six months’ revisions to price ratios, using mean consensus EPS 
forecasts for the next fiscal year  
Forecast accuracy Absolute earnings forecast error calculated as actual earnings per share minus the median 
forecasted EPS scaled by stock price 
Idiosyncratic 
volatility 
The standard deviation of the residuals of the Fama-French 3-factor model estimated using the 
daily stock returns in the past three months, specifically from day t-1 to t-63 
Institutional 
ownership 
Share of institutional ownership. Shares owned by institutes retrieved from Thomson Reuters 
LTG Most recent median consensus long-term growth forecast (divided by 100 in regressions) 
P/E Stock price divided by actual earnings from the last available fiscal year 
Returnm-12, m-7 Cumulative return from month -7 to -12 (day t-127 to t-252) 
Returnm-6, m-2 Cumulative return from month -2 to -6 (day t-22 to t-126) 
Returnt-21, t-6 Cumulative return from day t-6 to t-21 
Returnt-5, t-1 Cumulative return from day t-1 to t-5 before recommendation revision date t 
Sales growth Rolling sum of sales in the previous four quarters divided by the rolling sum of sales in the 
second preceding set of four quarters 
Size Natural logarithm of market value at day t-22 
SUE Standardized unexpected earnings. Unexpected earnings for the most recent reporting quarter 
scaled by its standard deviation over the eight preceding quarters. Unexpected earnings are 
EPS for the quarter t minus EPS for quarter t-4, where EPS is diluted excluding extraordinary 
items and adjusted for stock distributions. Most recent quarter is prior quarter before earnings 
announcement was made 
Turnover Average daily turnover in the previous three months divided by shares outstanding 
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be explicitly or intuitively aware of these variables to predict future returns and thus these 
variables correlate with analyst recommendations in the same way they are correlated with 
future returns when this assumption holds.  
Furthermore, control variables are not of the main interest as these are extensively studied by 
academics. Thus, the interpretation and discussion of results focus on the anchoring effects on 
the Approach dummies which give new insights. To cite the effects of few control variables, 
Lee and Swaninathan (2000) find that turnover has negative correlation with future returns, 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) find that sales growth has negative correlation to future returns, Chan 
et al. (2006) find accruals to have negative relationship with future returns and Beneish et al. 
(2001) find capital expenditures to have a negative relationship with future returns. For instance, 
negative correlation between turnover and future returns means that high (low) volume stocks 
are overvalued (undervalued). If analyst believes in the predictive power of trading volume, 
recommendations are more likely to lean more towards lower-volume stocks than higher-
volume stocks. Table 6 shows the summary of the expected effect of the approach dummies on 
downgrades based on the Hypotheses introduced in Chapter 1 – Introduction.  
Table 6. Summary of the expected effect of the approach dummies on downgrades 
This table shows the expected effect of the approach dummies on downgrades based on the Hypotheses introduced 
in Chapter 1 – Introduction.  
 
4.2 Selected valuation multiples and approach dummies 
The main valuation multiple used in this study is price-to-earnings (P/E). Price-to-earnings is 
calculated as market capitalization divided by the median forecast of EPS before extraordinary 
items at day t-1 for the next fiscal year. To arrive at P/E ratio, first market capitalization needs 
to be calculated. Furthermore, instead of pure next fiscal year EPS estimates, I use slightly 
smoothed estimates to smooth the change in estimation window after the announcement of the 
annual results. In Figure 6 in Appendix, I provide an example case how estimates are smoothed.  
Approach dummy Expected effect on downgrade 
Approach 52-week high stock price Positive 
Approach 52-week low stock price Negative 
Approach 2-year high P/E ratio Positive 
Approach 2-year low P/E ratio Negative 
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Market capitalization (mcap) in Equation 2 is defined as closing price on day t-1 (prc) 
multiplied by shares outstanding on day t-1 (shrout). If closing price is not available, bid/ask 
average is used as a proxy. Furthermore, Enterprise value is also needed in order to calculate 
other market multiples than P/E. Enterprise value (Eq. 3), in other words EV, at day t-1 is 
defined as the sum of market capitalization (mcap) and net debt. Net debt is the sum of total 
long-term debt (dlttq), debt in current liabilities (dlcq), redeemable noncontrolling interest on 
balance sheet (mibq) and total preferred/preference stock capital (pstkq) less cash and short 
term investments (cheq). The latest publicly available quarterly accounting information on day 
t-1 is used for the accounting information components. 
 
 
where subscript j denotes the stock j, q the latest available quarter and t-1 the day.  
As mentioned, the main valuation multiple used in this thesis is P/E.  Other multiples used are 
PEG ratio and Enterprise value based multiples of EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and EV/Sales. Table 
7 describes the calculations behind the multiples used. However, the next fiscal year period is 
smoothed as shown and explained more thoroughly in Figure 6 in Appendix. In addition to the 
forward-looking multiples used and defined in Table 7, regressions are tested with historical-
looking multiples which are based on actual measures in the last available fiscal year. EBITDA 
forecasts for instance are scarce in IBES database before 2002 and even after that, only a 
fraction of analysts have given EBITDA estimates to a fraction of companies.  
Table 7. Forward-looking valuation multiples 
This table shows the forward-looking valuation multiples used in the analyses. 
 
𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1 = 𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1 (2) 
𝐸𝑉𝑗,𝑡−1 = 𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑗,𝑞 + 𝑑𝑙𝑐𝑞𝑗,𝑞 + 𝑚𝑖𝑏𝑞𝑗,𝑞 + 𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑞𝑗,𝑞 − 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑞𝑗,𝑞 (3) 
Forward-looking valuation multiple Definition 
EV/EBITDA Enterprise value divided by median forecast EBITDA 
for the next fiscal year at day t-1 
EV/EBIT Enterprise value divided by median forecast EBIT for 
the next fiscal year at day t-1 
EV/Sales Enterprise value divided by median forecast Sales for 
the next fiscal year at day t-1 
P/E Market capitalization divided by the median forecast 
of EPS before extraordinary items for the next fiscal 
year at day t-1 
PEG ratio P/E ratio divided by median annual forecast of 
growth in EPS before extraordinary items at day t-1 
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For the approach dummies, I need to set a range where the level of the selected measure is 
considered to be close to e.g. the 52-week high or low. In the base case, 5% band is assumed. 
The 5% band is chosen similarly to Li et al. (2016) who use 5% band in their main tests. For 
downgrades (upgrades), it means that the selected measure at day t-1 needs to be within a 5% 
band below (above) the 52-week high (low) of the selected measure. Robustness checks are 
performed with different ranges from 1% up to 30% and shown in Figures 2-5. 
 
5. Empirical results and discussion of results 
This chapter provides results of empirical tests and the results are compared to the prior 
literature. The first two sections provide analysis for hypotheses 1-2 while the third section tests 
the robustness of these results. The fourth section provides analysis for hypotheses 3-4. In the 
fifth section additional regressions and robustness checks are run.   
5.1 Anchoring to the 52-week high stock price 
In this section, I present the results of the conditional logistic regression analysis on the 52-
week high phenomenon. I examine whether analysts partly anchor their views to the 52-week 
high stock price with similar analysis to Li et al. (2016). I also test the robustness of my results 
with different model specifications. Baseline regressions are run with Approach52 dummy that 
equals 1 if the stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the 52-week high stock price before 
the recommendation revision day t. Furthermore, I compare my results with Li et al. (2016) 
findings. Lastly, I run a set of regressions with different definitions of Approach52 dummy and 
results are illustrated in Figure 2. The Approach52 dummy is defined with various thresholds 
for the nearness of current price to the 52-week high stock price ranging from 1% to 30% below 
the 52-week high stock price.   
Table 8 reports the regression results of the conditional logit model for the anchoring effect of 
52-week high stock price on analyst recommendation downgrades. I estimate five models with 
different specifications, consistent to Li et al. (2016). Model 1 includes only Approach52 
dummy. Model 2 includes both Approach52 dummy and four Return variables that capture the 
price momentum effect. Model 3 includes also earnings momentum effects with Forecast 
revisions and SUE variables. Model 4 includes on top of that valuation indicators of Size, B/M 
(Book-to-market), Turnover and P/E (Price-to-earnings) as well as fundamental indicators of 
Accruals and Capex (Capital expenditure) and growth indicators of LTG (Long-term growth 
forecast) and Sales growth. Lastly, Model 5 controls also further factors related to analyst 
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recommendation decisions as indicated in Loh and Stulz (2011): Idiosyncratic volatility, 
Institutional ownership, Analyst coverage, Analyst dispersion, Analyst experience and Analyst 
herding. Definitions of all control variables are provided in Table 5 in Chapter 4 – Methods. 
Regressions also control for SIC 10 industry and year fixed effects and coefficients from logit 
regressions are reported as log odds ratios but interpreted in terms of odds ratios. The Wald chi-
squared statistics are statistically significant at the 1% level in all five model specifications 
which confirms the overall significance of the regression models.  
Table 8 shows the regression results that test Hypothesis 1. The approaching 52-week high 
dummy (Approach52) is significantly positive at the 1% level in all five models which means 
that analysts are more likely to downgrade stock recommendations with prices approaching the 
52-week high. Z-statistics is high, ranging between 7.65 and 9.48. The coefficient of 
Approach52 (log odds ratio) varies between 0.317 and 0.370. Thus, the corresponding odds 
ratio varies between 1.374 (e0.317) and 1.448 (e0.370). In terms of economic magnitude, the odds 
of being downgraded by analysts are 37.4% – 44.8% higher for companies with stock prices 
approaching the 52-week high than that for other companies.  
However, it is noticeable that variables Return t-21, t-6 and Forecast revisions are also significant 
at the 1% level in all of their model specifications and have many times higher coefficients. 
This implies that these variables are more powerful compared to Approach52 dummy even 
though the z-statistics are substantially smaller for both of these two variables. Coefficient for 
Return t-21, t-6 is positive and varies between 1.687 and 2.078 while coefficient for Forecast 
revisions is negative varies between -5.032 and -6.558. In addition, Return m-6, m-2 and  
Return m-12, m-7 variables are statistically significant in Models 2 and 3 but not in Models 4 and 
5. Furthermore, coefficients are significantly negative whereas coefficient for Return t-21, t-6 is 
positive. Return m-6, m-2 varies between -0.141 and -0.424 while Return m-12, m-7 varies between  
-0.034 and -0.169.  
As variable Return t-21, t-6 is significantly positive, it means that analysts are more likely to 
downgrade companies that have had recent price run-up between trading days t-21 and t-6. In 
Model 5, the coefficient for Return t-21, t-6  is 2.078, which means that the odds ratio associated 
with a 10% increase in Return t-21, t-6 is 1.231 (e
2.078×0.1). As a result, the odds of being 
downgraded increase by 23.1% with a 10% increase in price run-up between the trading days 
t-21 and t-6 before the recommendation revision day t. However, all other Return variables are 
negative and suggest that analysts are less likely to downgrade firms with recent price run-ups 
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in the last five trading days or in-between months m-12 and m-2 before the recommendation 
revision month m. Nevertheless, these results are insignificant in Model 4 with additional 
growth, value and fundamental indicators and in Model 5 where also analyst related factors as 
well as idiosyncratic volatility of the stock and institutional ownership are included. In contrast 
to my results, Li et al. (2016) find no statistical significance for Return t-21, t-6 and the variable 
is not consistently positive or negative. However, Li et al. (2016) find that other Return 
variables are negative (consistent with my results) and statistically significant (inconsistent with 
my results). The differences in results may be partly due to different sample size where my 
sample has less negative cumulative returns on average and less standard deviation and 
companies are of much larger size in terms of market capitalization.  
From other control variables, P/E and Turnover are statistically significant in Model 4 but 
insignificant in Model 5. Furthermore, their coefficients are close to zero. In Model 5, Analyst 
herding is statistically significant at 1% level and the coefficient is 0.269 and positive. Thus, it 
seems that herding increases the probability of downgrading, specifically when multiple 
analysts have given recommendation revisions for the same company on the same day. 
Results provide evidence for Hypothesis 1 and are consistent with Li et al. (2016). Findings by 
Li et al. (2016) using all control variables and excluding reiterations show that odds of being 
downgraded by analysts are 42.6% higher for companies with stock prices approaching 52-
week high than that of other companies whereas I find that they are 44.8% more likely9. The 
effect is thus consistent though slightly stronger with my sample. One reason for the difference 
is the sample size since Li et al. (2016) sample includes 121,158 observations while my main 
sample with all control variables include only 17,508 observations due to the tight requirements 
set for the earnings estimates (and control variables) in my analysis.  
Furthermore, in my Model 5, sample mean probability of a downgrade is 52.9% that 
corresponds to an odds ratio of 1.121. Li et al. (2016) sample mean probability with all control 
variables and including reiterations is 41.3% and corresponds to an odds ratio of 0.704. Authors 
show that if the odds of being downgraded for a stock were equal to the sample mean, then the 
odds ratio of 1.327 associated with approaching the 52-week high (Approach52=1) implies that 
the odds ratio of being downgraded would increase to 0.934. That corresponds to a probability 
of 48.3% so that increase in downgrade probability is about 17% when stock price is 
                                                 
9 Note that my sample excludes reiterations and Li et al. (2016) main sample includes reiterations where the odds 
of being downgraded by analysts are about 32.7% higher with all control variables. 
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approaching the 52-week high. In my Model 5, regression odds ratio is 1.448 which implies 
that the odds ratio of being downgraded would increase to 1.624. As my sample mean 
probability is 52.9%, the corresponding downgrade probability is 61.9% so the increase in 
probability is about 17% (new probability relative to the old probability) when stock price is 
approaching the 52-week high.  
Interpretation of my results is thus very similar to Li et al. (2016) even when they have included 
reiterations of recommendations in regressions. The economic magnitude of anchoring bias is 
also comparable to incentive bias in M&A deals. For instance, Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) 
find that an analyst is more likely to upgrade the recommendation within the next 90 days in 
M&A transaction in all-cash deals and that acquirer affiliation increases the odds of a 
recommendation upgrade of the acquirer by a factor of more than 1.5.  
In Figure 2, results of additional set of regressions with all control variables (as indicated in 
Model 5 of Table 8) but with different definitions of Approach52 dummy are illustrated. In 
Table 8, baseline regressions are run with Approach52 dummy that equals 1 if the stock price 
at day t-1 is within 5% threshold below the 52-week high stock price before the 
recommendation revision day t. In Table 8, the Approach52 dummy is defined with various 
thresholds for the nearness of price at day t-1 to the 52-week high stock price from 1% up to 
30% below the 52-week high stock price. The figure shows that similar log odds ratios are 
obtained with threshold of between ca. 5% and 10% and Approach52 dummy is significant at 
1% level until ca. 19% threshold. The results from these regressions give further support to my 
Hypothesis 1 that analysts partly anchor their recommendation revisions to 52-week high stock 
price.  
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Table 8. The effect of 52-week high stock price on analyst recommendation downgrade 
This table shows the predictability of approaching 52-week high stock price on recommendation downgrade. 
Results are based on conditional logit regression: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. Dependent variable 
Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. Approach52 is dummy 
that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the 52-week high. Vector X includes a set of control 
variables (See Table 5 for full definitions). Return variables denote for cumulative return between days t or months 
m, where Returnt-5, t-1 is from day t-5 to t-1, Returnt-21, t-6 is from day t-21 to t-6, Returnm-6, m-2 is from month -6 to 
month -2, and Returnm-12, m-7 is from month -12 to month -7. Forecast revisions is rolling sum of previous six 
months’ EPS revisions to price ratio. SUE is the standardized unexpected earnings. Size is the natural logarithm of 
market value at day t-22. B/M is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. P/E is price-to-earnings 
ratio based on actual earnings in the last available fiscal year. Turnover is average daily turnover in the previous 
three months divided by shares outstanding. Accruals are total accruals divided by average total assets on a 
quarterly basis. Capex is rolling sum of capital expenditure in the previous four quarters divided by average total 
assets. Sales growth is the rolling sum of sales in the previous four quarters divided by rolling sum of sales in the 
second preceding set of four quarters. LTG is median consensus long-term growth forecast. Idiosyncratic volatility 
is the standard deviation of the residuals of FF3-factor model. Institutional ownership is the ownership of institutes 
in percentages. Analyst coverage is number of analysts providing one-year earnings forecasts in prior three months. 
Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation across earnings forecasts in the prior three months. Analyst experience 
is the natural logarithm of recommendation revision year minus number of years plus one (or 0 if negative) since 
the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the firm in question. All regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry 
fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered standard 
errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for significance and ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance levels 
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
Cond. logit model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach52 0.321 *** 9.48 0.315 *** 8.67 0.317 *** 8.55 0.355 *** 7.65 0.370 *** 8.17
Return t-5, t-1 -0.208 -0.92 -0.010 -0.04 -0.169 -0.42 -0.093 -0.18
Return t-21, t-6 1.687 *** 11.29 1.841 *** 11.69 2.007 *** 6.04 2.078 *** 3.96
Return m-6, m-2 -0.424 *** -7.94 -0.269 *** -4.58 -0.160 -1.45 -0.141 -1.31
Return m-12, m-7 -0.169 *** -3.33 -0.101 * -1.88 -0.034 -0.49 -0.066 -0.63
Forecast revisions -6.558 *** -7.25 -5.461 *** -4.64 -5.032 *** -4.31
SUE 0.014 1.29 -0.002 -0.16 -0.006 -0.40
Size -0.006 -0.03 0.040 0.11
B/M 0.327 0.65 0.330 0.56
P/E -0.001 ** -2.11 -0.001 -1.36
Turnover 0.008 *** 2.61 0.003 1.13
Accruals 0.342 0.69 0.260 0.64
Capex -0.061 -0.12 0.057 0.05
Sales growth 0.309 0.60 0.270 0.58
LTG 0.003 0.24 0.000 -0.01
Idiosyncratic volatility 9.148 0.56
Institutional ownership 0.175 0.42
Analyst coverage -0.632 -0.17
Analyst dispersion -0.183 -0.51
Analyst experience -0.004 -0.90
Analyst herding 0.269 *** 3.35
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,258 30,001 28,562 17,684 17,508
Wald chi
2 89.81 296.86 324.74 274.49 309.90
Pseudo R
2
0.002 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.018
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Figure 2. The log odds ratio of being downgraded with nearness to the 52-week high 
Figure 2 shows the log odds ratio of being downgraded with nearness to the 52-week high stock price. Approaching 
52-week high dummy equals 1 if the stock price at trading day t-1 is within x% below the 52-week high stock 
price, i.e. (1-x) × 52-week high stock price < stock price at day t-1 < 52-week high stock price. Results are based 
on conditional logit regression with all control variables defined in Table 5. The logit regression is: 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, where subscript j and t denote the 
recommendation revision j issued on day t. Plotted coefficients are reported as log odds ratios. See Table 8 for 
more information on regressions with Approach52 dummy that has a threshold of 5% below the 52-week high. 
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5.2 Anchoring to the 52-week low stock price 
In this section, I present the results of the conditional logistic regression analysis on the 52-
week low phenomenon. I examine whether analysts partly anchor their views on the 52-week 
low stock price with similar analysis to Li et al. (2016). I also test robustness of my results with 
different model specifications. Baseline regressions are identical to Section 5.1 but instead of 
Approach52 dummy they are run with Approach52low dummy that equals 1 if the stock price 
at day t-1 is within 5% above the 52-week low stock price before the recommendation revision 
day t. Furthermore, I compare my results with Section 5.1 findings and Li et al. (2016) findings. 
Lastly, I run a set of regressions with different definitions of Approach52low dummy and results 
are illustrated in Figure 3. The Approach52low dummy is defined with various thresholds for 
the nearness of price at day t-1 to the 52-week low stock price ranging from 1% to 30% above 
the 52-week low stock price.  
Table 9 reports the regression results of the conditional logit model for the anchoring effect of 
52-week low stock price on analyst recommendation downgrades. The regression results test 
Hypothesis 2 which states that analysts would be less likely to downgrade the stock when stock 
prices approach the 52-week low. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the coefficient is positive and thus 
to the opposite direction than was predicted. The Wald chi-squared statistics are statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all five model specifications confirming the overall significance 
of the regression models. The approaching 52-week low dummy (Approach52low) is 
statistically significant and positive at the 1% level in all five models which means that analysts 
are more likely to downgrade stock recommendations when stock prices are approaching the 
52-week low. Z-statistics is high ranging from 4.72 to 6.11. Furthermore, the coefficient of 
Approach52low varies between 0.244 and 0.372, indicating very similar effect to the 52-week 
high phenomenon. The corresponding odds ratio varies between 1.276 (e0.244) and 1.451 (e0.372). 
Thus, the odds of being downgraded by analysts are 27.6% –  45.1% higher for companies with 
stock prices approaching the 52-week low than that for other companies. In the case of 
approaching 52-week high stock price (in Section 5.1), the range is 37.4% –  44.8%.  
When it comes to control variables, results are in line with Section 5.1 results. The statistically 
significant variables at the 1% level are the same in Model 5 as in Section 5.1. The coefficient 
for Return t-21, t-6 and Analyst herding are positive and for Forecast revisions is negative. Also 
coefficients for other control variables are mostly in similar magnitude to the Section 5.1 results. 
Results do not support Hypothesis 2 but are partly consistent with Li et al. (2016). Li et al. 
(2016) find that the coefficient for Approach52low is slightly positive (0.033) but they do not 
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find any statistically significant results while my results are statistically significant. One reason 
for Li et al. (2016) not finding significant results may be that they included reiterations in the 
regressions which may weaken the effect as it seems to be the case in their results of the 52-
week high phenomenon (The effect is stronger without reiterations as mentioned in Section 5.1). 
Another difference is the sample size as my sample size is smaller with larger companies and 
the companies have had less negative cumulative returns before the recommendation revision.  
Results provide evidence against Hypothesis 2 and lead to rejection of Hypothesis 2. 52-week 
low seems to affect similarly to 52-week high phenomenon. The increase in downgrade 
probability is about 17% in case of approaching the 52-week low stock price and also about 17% 
when approaching the 52-week high stock price10.  Figure 3 shows further support for the effect. 
It shows the log odds ratio from the results of additional set of regressions with all control 
variables (as indicated in Model 5 of Table 9). Regressions are run with different definitions of 
Approach52low dummy. The Approach52low dummy is defined with various thresholds for 
the nearness of price at day t-1 to the 52-week low stock price ranging from 1% up to 30% 
above the 52-week low stock price. The figure shows that similar log odds ratios are obtained 
with threshold of between ca. 5% and 8% and Approach52low dummy is significant at the 1% 
level until ca. 17% threshold.  Analysts thus seem to partly anchor their recommendations to 
both 52-week high and 52-week low stock prices and as a result downgrades are more likely in 
both reference points.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
10 Based on Model 5 coefficients in both main regressions (Table 8 and Table 9). 
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Table 9. The effect of 52-week low stock price on analyst recommendation downgrade 
This table shows the predictability of approaching 52-week low stock price on recommendation downgrade. 
Results are based on conditional logit regression: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 , where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. 
Dependent variable Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. 
Approach52low is dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% above the 52-week low. Vector X 
includes a set of control variables (See Table 5 for full definitions). Return variables denote for cumulative return 
between days t or months m, where Returnt-5, t-1 is from day t-5 to t-1, Returnt-21, t-6 is from day t-21 to t-6,  
Returnm-6, m-2 is from month -6 to month -2, and Returnm-12, m-7 is from month -12 to month -7. Forecast revisions 
is rolling sum of previous six months’ EPS revisions to price ratio. SUE is the standardized unexpected earnings. 
Size is the natural logarithm of market value at day t-22. B/M is book value of equity divided by market value of 
equity. P/E is price-to-earnings ratio based on actual earnings in the last available fiscal year. Turnover is average 
daily turnover in the previous three months divided by shares outstanding. Accruals are total accruals divided by 
average total assets on a quarterly basis. Capex is rolling sum of capital expenditure in the previous four quarters 
divided by average total assets. Sales growth is the rolling sum of sales in the previous four quarters divided by 
rolling sum of sales in the second preceding set of four quarters. LTG is median consensus long-term growth 
forecast. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals of FF3-factor model. Institutional 
ownership is the ownership of institutes in percentages. Analyst coverage is number of analysts providing one-
year earnings forecasts in prior three months. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation across earnings forecasts 
in the prior three months. Analyst experience is the natural logarithm of recommendation revision year minus 
number of years plus one (or 0 if negative) since the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the firm in question. 
All regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and 
z-statistics are based on two-way clustered standard errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for significance and ***, 
**, and * denote the statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
 
  
Cond. logit model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach52low 0.244 *** 4.72 0.335 *** 6.11 0.323 *** 5.81 0.372 *** 5.31 0.362 *** 5.16
Return t-5, t-1 0.236 1.05 0.438 * 1.86 0.321 0.81 0.404 0.77
Return t-21, t-6 2.031 *** 13.43 2.196 *** 13.74 2.397 *** 7.37 2.476 *** 4.70
Return m-6, m-2 -0.271 *** -5.05 -0.115 * -1.94 0.003 0.03 0.024 0.23
Return m-12, m-7 -0.125 ** -2.43 -0.057 -1.05 0.015 0.21 -0.015 -0.14
Forecast revisions -6.442 *** -7.15 -5.387 *** -4.58 -5.064 *** -4.33
SUE 0.013 1.22 -0.003 -0.23 -0.007 -0.44
Size -0.001 -0.01 0.045 0.13
B/M 0.317 0.63 0.323 0.55
P/E -0.001 ** -2.07 -0.001 -1.35
Turnover 0.007 ** 2.27 0.003 1.05
Accruals 0.265 0.53 0.183 0.45
Capex -0.106 -0.21 0.023 0.02
Sales growth 0.310 0.60 0.275 0.59
LTG 0.002 0.16 -0.001 -0.07
Idiosyncratic volatility 7.876 0.48
Institutional ownership 0.167 0.40
Analyst coverage -0.679 -0.19
Analyst dispersion -0.199 -0.56
Analyst experience -0.005 -0.97
Analyst herding 0.272 *** 3.41
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,258 30,001 28,562 17,684 17,508
Wald chi
2 22.31 248.90 273.91 234.36 263.89
Pseudo R
2 0.001 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.016
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Figure 3. The log odds ratio of being downgraded with nearness to the 52-week low 
Figure 3 shows the log odds ratio of being downgraded with nearness to the 52-week low stock price. Approaching 
52-week low dummy equals 1 if the stock price at trading day t-1 is within x% above the 52-week low stock price, 
i.e. 52-week low stock price < stock price at day t-1 < (1+x) × 52-week low stock price. Results are based on 
conditional logit regression with all control variables defined in Table 5. The logit regression is: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 , where subscript j and t denote the 
recommendation revision j issued on day t. Plotted coefficients are reported as log odds ratios. See Table 9 for 
more information on regressions with Approach52low dummy that has a threshold of 5% above the 52-week low. 
 
  
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0 % 5 % 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %
Signifant at 1% level Significant at 5% level Significant at 10% level Insignificant
L
o
g
o
d
d
s
 r
a
ti
o
 o
f 
b
e
in
g
 d
o
w
n
g
ra
d
e
d
% above the 52-week low
Significant
Insignificant
41 
 
5.3 Robustness checks for the 52-week high and low phenomenon 
5.3.1 Approaching 52-week high and low stock price 
As a robustness check for the results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, I run conditional logistic regression 
including the approach dummies of both 52-week high and 52-low stock price. Results are 
consistent with results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 and both approach dummies are significant at 1% 
level in all five model specifications. Results are provided in Table 10. Furthermore, I run 
regressions with alternative methods and measures of approaching 52-week high and low stock 
prices. In Table 11, I run similar regressions to the main tests with OLS and probit models. I 
also test consistency of results with alternative measures to 52-week high and low by using the 
price relative to 52-week high (low) and square root of price to 52-week high (low). The results 
are run with OLS, probit and logit models and are provided in Table 11 as well. Results give 
further support for the statistical significance of the measures.  
Table 10 reports the regression results of the conditional logit model for the anchoring effects 
of the 52-week high and low stock prices on analyst recommendation downgrades. The Wald 
chi-squared statistics are statistically significant at the 1% level in all five model specifications 
confirming the overall significance of the regression models. The coefficients for Approach52 
are similar to regression results in Table 8 and the coefficients for Approach52low are similar 
to Table 9. Furthermore, both dummies have similar, positive effect on recommendation 
downgrades11. In Model 5, the coefficient for Approach52 is 0.379 and for Approach52low is 
0.383. This means that the odds of being downgraded by analysts are ca. 46.1% – 46.7% higher 
for companies with stock prices approaching the 52-week high or low stock price than that for 
other companies.  
Nevertheless, it is noticeable that from control variables Return t-21, t-6 and Forecast revisions 
seem to be more important compared to Approach dummies as these dummies have higher 
coefficients and they are statistically significant at the 1% level. However, this is partly in line 
with Li et al. (2016) as their results also indicate that two Return variables are greater compared 
to Approach52 dummy but they also find that the coefficients for Turnover and Idiosyncratic 
volatility are high. In my regression, the coefficient for idiosyncratic volatility is also extremely 
high but I find it statistically insignificant.   
                                                 
11 Note that these Approach dummies are not coinciding for any recommendation revision, i.e. that both 
dummies would have the value of 1 at the same time. 
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Table 11 reports the regressions results with different regression models and different measures 
for approach dummies. The logit and probit regressions have Downgrade as the dependent 
variable whereas in OLS regression Recommendation revision is the dependent variable. 
Models 1 and 2 confirm the significance of Approach52 and Approach52low dummies as both 
OLS and probit regressions yield statistically significant results at the 1% level. Coefficients 
are also to the same direction and of similar kind of magnitude. Furthermore, Return t-21, t-6 as 
well as Forecast revisions and Analyst herding are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
supporting the results in the main tests of Sections 5.1 and 5.2. In addition, many other control 
variables have statistical significance in these econometric models which is in line with Li et al. 
(2016) results. 
Table 11 also reports regressions with an alternative method to measure the nearness to the 52-
week high and low stock price. Price to 52 high and Price to 52 low and their square roots 
measure how near the price is relative to the 52-week high and low. Models 3-5 (Columns 4-6) 
show regression results of OLS, probit and logit regressions with these measures, supporting 
the results from the main tests that analysts partly anchor their recommendation revisions to 
both 52-week high and 52-week low stock prices.  
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Table 10. The effect of 52-week high and low on analyst recommendation downgrade 
This table shows the predictability of approaching 52-week high and low stock price on recommendation 
downgrade. The cond. logit regression is: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. 
Dependent variable Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. 
Approach52 (Approach52low) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 
52-week high (low). Vector X includes a set of control variables (See Table 5 for full definitions).  Return variables 
denote for cumulative return between days t or months m, where Returnt-5, t-1 is from day t-5 to t-1, Returnt-21, t-6 is 
from day t-21 to t-6, Returnm-6, m-2 is from month -6 to month -2, and Returnm-12, m-7 is from month -12 to month -7. 
Forecast revisions is rolling sum of previous six months’ EPS revisions to price ratio. SUE is the standardized 
unexpected earnings. Size is the natural logarithm of market value at day t-22. B/M is book value of equity divided 
by market value of equity. P/E is price-to-earnings ratio based on actual earnings in the last available fiscal year. 
Turnover is average daily turnover in the previous three months divided by shares outstanding. Accruals are total 
accruals divided by average total assets on a quarterly basis. Capex is rolling sum of capital expenditure in the 
previous four quarters divided by average total assets. Sales growth is the rolling sum of sales in the previous four 
quarters divided by rolling sum of sales in the second preceding set of four quarters. LTG is median consensus 
long-term growth forecast. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals of FF3-factor model. 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of institutes in percentages. Analyst coverage is number of analysts 
providing one-year earnings forecasts in prior three months. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation across 
earnings forecasts in the prior three months. Analyst experience is the natural logarithm of recommendation 
revision year minus number of years plus one (or 0 if negative) since the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the 
firm in question. All regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as 
log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered standard errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for 
significance and ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Cond. logit model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach52 0.339 *** 9.90 0.323 *** 8.87 0.326 *** 8.75 0.364 *** 7.84 0.379 *** 8.37
Approach52low 0.295 *** 5.64 0.353 *** 6.42 0.342 *** 6.12 0.391 *** 5.58 0.383 *** 5.46
Return t-5, t-1 -0.031 -0.14 0.166 0.70 0.020 0.05 0.094 0.18
Return t-21, t-6 1.813 *** 11.99 1.966 *** 12.34 2.148 *** 6.46 2.217 *** 4.21
Return m-6, m-2 -0.372 *** -6.86 -0.220 *** -3.70 -0.111 -1.00 -0.091 -0.84
Return m-12, m-7 -0.146 *** -2.85 -0.079 -1.46 -0.012 -0.17 -0.045 -0.43
Forecast revisions -6.435 *** -7.15 -5.225 *** -4.43 -4.790 *** -4.09
SUE 0.015 1.32 -0.002 -0.12 -0.006 -0.38
Size -0.007 -0.05 0.038 0.11
B/M 0.325 0.65 0.326 0.55
P/E -0.001 ** -2.09 -0.001 -1.34
Turnover 0.008 *** 2.63 0.003 1.08
Accruals 0.333 0.68 0.251 0.62
Capex -0.045 -0.09 0.066 0.06
Sales growth 0.316 0.61 0.276 0.59
LTG 0.003 0.25 0.000 0.00
Idiosyncratic volatility 9.410 0.58
Institutional ownership 0.174 0.42
Analyst coverage -0.634 -0.18
Analyst dispersion -0.170 -0.48
Analyst experience -0.004 -0.90
Analyst herding 0.275 *** 3.42
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,258 30,001 28,562 17,684 17,508
Wald chi
2 114.84 334.25 358.24 306.04 342.71
Pseudo R
2 0.003 0.011 0.013 0.0169 0.019
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Table 11. Alternative methods and measures of approaching 52-week high and low 
This table reports robustness tests by different methods including OLS, probit and logit models. Logit and probit 
regression are run as follows: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. OLS 
regression is run as follows: 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. Dependent variable 
in probit and logit regressions is Downgrade which is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 
0 for upgrades. Dependent variable in OLS regressions is Revision which is the recommendation revision which 
gets values between -4 to 4 where positive values indicate upgrades and negative values downgrades. Approach52 
is dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the 52-week high. Approach52low is dummy 
that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% above the 52-week low. Price to 52 high and Price to 52 low 
are alternative measures for measuring nearness to 52-week high stock price and 52-week low price, respectively. 
Sqrt price to 52 high and Sqrt price to 52 low are square roots of the aforementioned prices relative to 52-week 
high and low and capture the non-linear relationship between recommendation revision and price ratios.  Vector 
X includes a set of control variables with definitions found in Table 5. OLS regressions control for firm and year 
fixed effects. Probit and logit regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry fixed effects. Coefficients are 
reported as log odds ratios in probit and logit regressions and z-statistics (or t-statistics in OLS) are based on two-
way clustered standard errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for significance and ***, **, and * denote the 
statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS (Revision) Probit (Downgrade) OLS (Revision) Probit (Downgrade) Logit (Downgrade)
(Dependent variable) Coef. Sig. t -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. t -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach52 -0.248 *** -7.30 0.240 *** 7.49
Approach52low -0.263 *** -4.97 0.241 *** 3.97
Price to 52 high -3.397 *** -4.00 4.324 *** 4.94 7.391 *** 5.02
Sqrt price to 52 high 8.151 *** 5.72 -9.527 *** -6.51 -16.186 *** -6.48
Price to 52 low -1.409 *** -6.87 1.290 *** 8.94 2.099 *** 8.49
Sqrt price to 52 low 5.704 *** 9.72 -5.448 *** -11.99 -8.887 *** -11.34
Return t-5, t-1 -0.473 ** -2.11 0.043 0.09 -2.632 *** -10.48 2.267 *** 4.54 3.722 *** 4.49
Return t-21, t-6 -1.842 *** -12.85 1.335 *** 7.95 -3.636 *** -21.89 3.290 *** 12.83 5.423 *** 12.42
Return m-6, m-2 -0.036 -0.63 -0.052 -1.11 -1.298 *** -13.50 1.240 *** 12.85 2.057 *** 12.06
Return m-12, m-7 -0.002 -0.04 -0.029 -0.72 -0.570 *** -9.20 0.556 *** 6.99 0.925 *** 6.82
Forecast revisions 2.364 *** 3.20 -3.257 *** -4.35 1.583 ** 2.05 -2.088 ** -2.30 -3.576 ** -2.37
SUE 0.001 0.10 -0.002 -0.73 0.004 0.34 -0.004 -1.13 -0.007 -1.17
Size -0.184 *** -5.05 0.019 ** 2.14 -0.091 ** -2.47 -0.003 -0.32 -0.004 -0.25
B/M -0.700 *** -8.43 0.182 *** 4.7 -0.340 *** -4.08 0.049 1.24 0.083 1.27
P/E 0.002 *** 2.84 -0.001 *** -3.14 0.001 1.12 0.000 -0.87 -0.001 -0.93
Turnover -0.003 -1.15 0.001 1.21 0.001 0.24 -0.002 -1.30 -0.003 -1.25
Accruals -0.123 -0.47 0.108 1.17 0.153 0.59 -0.056 -0.63 -0.093 -0.63
Capex -0.671 * -1.67 0.074 0.38 -0.340 -0.86 0.032 0.15 0.044 0.13
Sales growth -0.474 *** -5.85 0.212 *** 3.48 -0.351 *** -4.20 0.167 ** 2.38 0.271 ** 2.46
LTG 0.004 1.35 -0.001 -0.69 0.003 1.04 0.000 -0.22 0.000 -0.17
Idiosyncratic volatility -7.684 *** -3.80 5.988 *** 5.22 1.299 0.57 -1.424 -0.70 -2.406 -0.71
Institutional ownership -0.005 -0.05 0.115 *** 3.02 -0.046 -0.45 0.113 ** 2.30 0.185 ** 2.38
Analyst coverage -0.151 -0.47 -0.327 ** -2.26 -0.265 -0.83 -0.143 -0.97 -0.235 -0.99
Analyst dispersion 0.207 * 1.94 -0.084 * -1.91 0.121 1.11 -0.060 -1.12 -0.101 -1.18
Analyst experience 0.005 ** 2.09 -0.003 -1.37 0.005 ** 2.31 -0.003 -1.47 -0.006 -1.48
Analyst herding -0.214 *** -4.39 0.169 *** 8.46 -0.156 *** -3.38 0.130 *** 5.28 0.202 *** 5.17
Intercept 4.735 *** 5.84 -0.545 ** -2.49 -7.013 *** -5.92 9.723 *** 14.19 16.135 *** 13.45
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 17,537 17,537 16,957 16,957 16,957
Adjusted R
2
/Pseudo R
2 0.024 0.023 0.042 0.040 0.040
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5.3.2 Horse-race regression between the 52-week high/low stock price and target prices 
To check whether the 52-week high and low phenomena are dominant factors to drive 
recommendation revisions instead of target prices set by the same analyst who revises the 
recommendation, I run a horse-race regression between the 52-week high/low stock price and 
target prices. Birru (2015) finds that analysts are anchoring to target prices near the 52-week 
high stock prices and that analysts’ target price forecasts are more pessimistic for stocks near 
the 52-week high than for other stocks. However, Li et al. (2015) find that anchoring to the 52-
week high stock price is the dominant factor and find no statistical significance for the target 
prices in horse race regressions with all control variables.  
In Table 12, Panel A reports horse-race regressions between the 52-week high stock price and 
the target prices with and without all control variables. I create dummies for target prices so 
that Target price 5% (Target price 10%) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is 
within 5% (10%) below the target price issued by the same analyst who revises the 
recommendation. Panel A shows that without control variables Target price 5% is significant 
at the 5% level and Target price 10% at the 10% level. When regressions include all control 
variables, Target price 10% loses significance but Target price 5% stays significant at the 10% 
level. Interpretation of result is consistent with Birru (2015) as the coefficient is positive and 
thus analysts are more likely to downgrade the stocks near the target prices. As target price has 
some predictability on recommendation downgrades, I include it in additional control variables 
in further regressions. Nonetheless, it seems that Approach52 dummy is more powerful dummy 
than the Target price 5%.   
In Table 12, Panel B reports horse-race regressions between the 52-week low stock price and 
the target prices with and without all control variables. I create dummies for target prices so 
that Target price 5% low (Target price 10% low) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day 
t-1 is within 5% (10%) above the target price issued by the same analyst who revises the 
recommendation. Panel B shows that with all control variables, target price dummies lose 
significance and thus these variables have no predictability on recommendation downgrades. 
The Wald chi-squared statistics are statistically significant at the 1% level in all model 
specifications both in Panel A and Panel B, confirming the overall significance of the regression 
models. Table 13 shows the regression results from the conditional logistic regression including 
both Approach dummies and Target price 5% dummy with five model specifications. Results 
from these regressions support the main test results.  
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Table 12. Horse race between the 52-week high/low and target price 
This table shows horse-race regression between the 52-week high stock price and target price in Panel A and horse-
race regression between the 52-week low stock price and target price in Panel B. Conditional logit regression 
is: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 , 
where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. Dependent variable Downgrade is a 
dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. In Panel A, Target price 5% (Target 
price 10%) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% (10%) below the target price issued by 
the same analyst who revises the recommendation. In Panel B, Target price 5% low (Target price 10% low) is a 
dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% (10%) above the target price issued by the same analyst 
who revises the recommendation. Vector X includes a set of control variables with definitions found in Table 5. 
All regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry fixed effects. Control variables are added when specified. 
Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered standard errors by firm 
and year. Sig. denotes for significance and ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  
Panel A: Horse race between the 52-week high and target price
Cond. logit model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach52 0.310 *** 9.20 0.309 *** 9.20 0.360 *** 7.86 0.366 *** 7.79
Target price 5% 0.112 ** 2.45 0.143 * 1.79
Target price 10% 0.060 * 1.71 0.048 0.69
Controls No No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,258 35,258 17,508 17,508
Wald chi
2 92.19 89.88 313.77 309.85
Pseudo R
2 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.018
Panel A: Horse race between the 52-week low and target price
Cond. logit model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach52low 0.253 *** 4.89 0.247 *** 4.77 0.360 *** 5.14 0.361 *** 5.15
Target price 5% low 0.214 *** 3.87 0.194 1.55
Target price 10% low 0.120 * 1.67 0.072 0.57
Controls No No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,258 35,258 17,508 17,508
Wald chi
2 36.36 24.74 270.20 264.38
Pseudo R
2 0.001 0.001 0.016 0.016
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Table 13. The effect of 52-week high/low and target price on recommendation 
downgrade 
This table shows the predictability of approaching the 52-week high and the 52-week low stock price as well as 
approaching the target price on recommendation downgrade. The conditional (fixed effects) logit regression is: 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ52𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. Dependent variable 
Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. Approach52 
(Approach52low) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 52-week high 
(low). Target is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the target price issued by the 
same analyst who revises the recommendation. Vector X includes a set of control variables with definitions found 
in Table 5. All regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds 
ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered standard errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for significance 
and ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
Cond. logit model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach52 0.328 *** 9.62 0.316 *** 8.71 0.320 *** 8.63 0.355 *** 7.50 0.369 *** 8.06
Approach52low 0.300 *** 5.73 0.355 *** 6.45 0.343 *** 6.14 0.393 *** 5.61 0.386 *** 5.49
Target 0.122 *** 2.66 0.102 ** 2.09 0.081 1.63 0.136 * 1.88 0.148 * 1.87
Return t-5, t-1 -0.057 -0.25 0.144 0.61 -0.013 -0.03 0.058 0.11
Return t-21, t-6 1.791 *** 11.83 1.948 *** 12.22 2.118 *** 6.50 2.185 *** 4.23
Return m-6, m-2 -0.376 *** -6.93 -0.225 *** -3.78 -0.118 -1.07 -0.099 -0.93
Return m-12, m-7 -0.145 *** -2.82 -0.079 -1.45 -0.011 -0.16 -0.044 -0.43
Forecast revisions -6.396 *** -7.13 -5.141 *** -4.37 -4.692 *** -4.02
SUE 0.015 1.33 -0.002 -0.13 -0.006 -0.39
Size -0.007 -0.04 0.039 0.11
B/M 0.331 0.66 0.332 0.56
P/E -0.001 ** -2.10 -0.001 -1.35
Turnover 0.008 *** 2.65 0.003 1.08
Accruals 0.329 0.67 0.248 0.62
Capex -0.042 -0.08 0.070 0.06
Sales growth 0.315 0.61 0.274 0.59
LTG 0.003 0.28 0.000 0.03
Idiosyncratic volatility 9.530 0.58
Institutional ownership 0.178 0.43
Analyst coverage -0.636 -0.18
Analyst dispersion -0.168 -0.47
Analyst experience -0.004 -0.89
Analyst herding 0.277 *** 3.47
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,258 30,001 28,562 17,684 17,508
Wald chi
2 117.39 335.81 358.91 310.07 347.09
Pseudo R
2 0.003 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.019
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5.4 Anchoring to P/E ratios and other valuation multiples 
This section first tests whether anchoring to high and low P/E ratios is found. Regressions are 
performed with time periods of 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years and 10 years. It seems that only 
2-year time period shows statistically significant results. Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the 
results of anchoring to the 2-year high and low P/E ratios with different definitions of Approach 
dummies. Approach dummies are defined with different thresholds for the nearness of the 
forward-looking P/E at day t-1 before recommendation revision day t to the 2-year high (low) 
P/E ratio from 1% up to 30% below (above) the 2-year high (low) P/E. Lastly in this section, 
correlations with different Approach dummies are compared with each other including also 
Enterprise value multiples. Furthermore, a regression is run with all control variables and 
Approach dummies of the 52-week high and low stock prices as well as the 2-year high and 
low P/E ratios and target price. A regression is also run with adding two interaction terms: with 
52-week high (low) stock price and 2-year high (low) stock price. Section 5.5 includes 
robustness checks for the results in this section.  
Table 14 shows the effect of high and low P/E ratios on recommendation downgrades. Panel A 
tests the effects of high P/E on downgrades whereas Panel B tests the effects of low P/E on 
downgrades. All regressions include control variables and control for year and SIC 10 industry 
fixed effects. Furthermore, regressions are tested with additional set of control variables, 
including dummies Approach52, Target and Appraoch52low, which are seen to have 
predictability on downgrades in Sections 5.1-5.3. Approach52 (Approach52low) is a dummy 
that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 52-week high (low) stock 
price at day t-1. Target is a dummy that equals 1 if the target price is within 5% below the target 
price issued by the same analyst who revises the recommendation. The Wald chi-squared 
statistics are statistically significant at the 1% level in all model specifications both in Panel A 
and Panel B, confirming the overall significance of the regression models. 
Panel A in Table 14 shows that neither 5-year nor 10-year Approach high P/E dummy is 
significant with or without additional control variables. Instead, Approach 1-year, 2-year and 
3-year high P/E dummies without additional control variables show some statistical 
significance on recommendation downgrade. Both Approach 1-year and 2-year high P/E 
dummies are statistically significant at the 1% level, having positive coefficients of 0.202 and 
0.282, respectively. Approach 3-year year high P/E dummy has a positive coefficient of 0.178 
and is only statistically significant at the 10% level. Nonetheless, when additional controls are 
included, only Approach 2-year high P/E shows statistical significance, at the 10% level. Thus 
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it seems that from the various time periods, the approaching the 2-year high P/E ratio is the 
most important one. Furthermore, the coefficient is positive, thus the analyst is more likely to 
downgrade the recommendation when the forward-looking P/E approaches the 2-year high P/E, 
supporting the Hypothesis 3.  
Panel B in Table 14 shows that only the 2-year time period yields statistically significant results 
for the Approach 2-year dummy, similarly to results in Panel A. Approach 2-year low P/E 
dummy is statistically significant at the 10% level, having a coefficient of 0.179 when additional 
control variables are included in the regression. The coefficient is positive, indicating that 
analysts are more likely to downgrade the recommendation when the forward-looking P/E 
approaches the 2-year low P/E. This leads to rejecting the Hypothesis 4 but results are in line 
with the anchoring effect found on the 52-week low stock price. From Panel B, it is also seen 
that without additional control variables, the Approach 3-year low P/E and Approach 5-year 
low P/E dummies show some statistical significance at the 5% level and at the 10% level, 
respectively. However, since these dummies yield insignificant results when taking into account 
the additional controls, I conclude that the 2-year ratios are the most important ratios. Further 
regressions including valuation multiples with other time periods than the 2-year time periods 
are out of the scope of this thesis and left for further studies to examine12.  
To confirm the importance of the 2-year high and low ratios, Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate 
the log odds ratios and statistical significance of Approach 2-year high P/E and Approach 2-
year low P/E dummies with various thresholds for the nearness of forward-looking P/E ratio to 
the 2-year high and low P/E ratios ranging from 1% up to 30% below and above the 2-year high 
and low P/E ratio, respectively. To have high comparability with Figure 2 and Figure 3, only 
the same control variables are included in regressions as in Figures 2 and 3. Thus, the anchoring 
effects can be more easily compared between all Figures 2-5.  Results in Figures 4 and 5 give 
further support for the results in this section that analysts partly anchor their recommendation 
revisions to the 2-year high and low P/E ratios. However, the impact is two times higher with 
Approach dummies of 52-week high and low stock prices. In Figure 4, log odds ratios are of 
similar size to results in Table 14 when the Approach dummy is defined as 4-8% below the 2-
year high P/E and Approach dummy stays statistically significant until the threshold of 28%. 
In Figure 5, somewhat similar log odds ratios to results in Table 14 are obtained when the 
                                                 
12 To cite a few additional interesting periods to examine: all-time high and low P/E ratios and Schillers 
cyclically adjusted high and low P/E ratios. 
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Approach dummy is defined as 3-6% above the 2-year low P/E and Approach dummy stays 
statistically significant until the threshold of 10%. 
Table 15 shows the correlation matrix of different Approach dummies. Panel A shows 
correlations with approaching high dummies with 5% threshold below the high price or ratio. 
Panel B shows correlations with approaching low dummies with 5% threshold above the low 
price or ratio. Panel C includes the correlations between the select approaching high and low 
dummies that are used in the main tests of this thesis. These include the 52-week high and low 
stock price dummies, the 2-year high and low P/E dummies and 5% below the target price 
dummy. In the end of this section, regressions are run including all of these dummies and 
control variables.  
Firstly, Table 15 shows that there is a high correlation between the dummies of approaching 
the 52-week high stock price and the 2-year high stock price (Correlation of 0.784 in Panel A). 
The correlation is also high between the dummies of approaching the 52-week low stock price 
and the 2-year low stock price (Correlation of 0.565 in Panel B). As a result, it is highly likely 
that similar, statistically significant results are obtained by either using 52-week high and low 
stock price or the 2-year high and low stock price dummies13. Due to a very high correlation, I 
only use 52-week high and low stock price dummies in the regressions. 
Secondly, Table 15 shows the correlations between the valuation multiples. Panel A shows the 
correlations between the 2-year high P/E, PEG, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and EV/Sales. Panel B 
shows the correlations between the 2-year low P/E, PEG, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and EV/Sales. 
The correlations between the Enterprise value (EV) multiples are high, ranging from 0.368 to 
0.665. Particularly high correlations are between EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT (0.665 between 
high dummies and 0.547 between low dummies) and EV/EBITDA and EV/Sales (0.548 
between high dummies and 0.479 between low dummies). In addition, very high correlations 
are found between the P/E and PEG ratios (0.506 between high dummies and 0.527 between 
low dummies). Furthermore, it is seen that P/E ratio has correlation to EV multiples as well, 
with correlation ranging from 0.283 to 0.362. Thus, it is likely that regression results by using 
EV multiples or PEG ratio would be consistent to regressions with P/E ratio. However, as 
discussed in Introduction and Literature review, the analysts use P/E ratios to justify their 
                                                 
13 Robustness check in Table 23 confirms the assumption and reports the coefficients of 2-year high and low 
stock price dummies with and without 52-week high and low stock price dummies. 
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recommendations and thus it is likely that regression results are weaker with EV multiples. 
Section 5.5 includes regressions with EV multiples and PEG ratios.  
Thirdly, Panel C in Table 15 shows that between the select approaching high and low dummies, 
there is somewhat high correlation between approaching 52-week high stock price and 
approaching 2-year high P/E (Correlation of 0.349) and between approaching 52-week low 
stock price and approaching 2-year low P/E (Correlation of 0.369). Thus, the high (low) points 
of 52-week high and 2-year high (low) somewhat coincide with each other. As a result, I also 
check robustness of the regression results by adding interaction terms between these dummies. 
On top of that, Panel C shows that between other approach dummies, the correlations are rather 
close to zero, being 0.144 at highest.  
Last part of this section shows the results from the conditional logit regressions with all the 
select approaching high and low dummies (the same as in Panel C of Table 15) that are seen to 
have effect on downgrades. Table 16 shows the results without the interaction terms and Table 
17 with interaction terms. All regressions include the usual control variables used in earlier 
sections as well as year and industry fixed effects. The Wald-chi squared statistics are 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all model specifications, confirming the overall 
significance of the results. Interaction term of 2-year high # 52-week high shows the effect 
when forward-looking P/E is approaching the 2-year high P/E ratio and stock price is 
approaching the 52-week high at the same time. Similarly, interaction term of 2-year low # 52-
week low shows the effect when these dummies are approaching the corresponding low values 
at the same time.  
Table 16 shows the conditional logistic regression results without interaction terms. Results 
indicate that the 52-week high and low phenomena are important anchors for analysts as both 
dummies are statistically significant at the 1% level in all five models. It is also seen that 
Forecast revisions and Return t-21, t-6 seem to be most important factors to affect downgrade 
decisions which is in line with all earlier results. There seems to be also some statistical 
significance found from Approach 2-year high P/E, Targer price high 5% and Approach 2-year 
low P/E dummies but all of them are only statistically significant at the 10% level in Model 5. 
This is also in line with earlier regression results.   
Table 17 shows the effect of 52-week high and low stock price and 2-year high and low P/E 
ratio on recommendation downgrade with two interaction terms. It seems that interaction terms 
are statistically significant at the 1-5% level in all five models. In addition, the direction of the 
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coefficient of the interaction term 2-year low # 52-week low is negative (-0.653) in Model 5, 
indicating that when stock price is approaching the 52-week low and P/E ratio is approaching 
the 2-year low, the analyst is more likely to upgrade the stock. This is new insight, which is 
actually in line with Hypothesis 2 and 4. The situation is also illustrated in Figure 1 where an 
analyst upgrades his recommendation in a similar situation. One interpretation of this result is 
that analysts see the stock price and P/E ratio to have reached a support level so that the stock 
price cannot go much lower anymore and hence they overreact in the situation and revise their 
recommendations upwards. Thus, odds of being downgraded are 48.0% lower for companies 
with stock prices approaching the 52-week low stock prices and at the same time with forward-
looking P/E ratios approaching the 2-year low P/E ratios than that of other companies14. 
Furthermore, Table 17 shows that Approach52 and Approach52low are statistically significant 
at 1% level in all five models, supporting the anchoring hypotheses. The effect of anchoring 
seems to be slightly higher when the stock price is approaching the 52-week high and forward-
looking P/E is approaching the 2-year high (Coefficient of 0.332) compared to only approaching 
the 52-week high stock price (Coefficient of 0.318). However, it seems that 2-year high P/E 
dummy does not play significant role alone as it yields insignificant results and the coefficient 
is slightly negative and close to zero. Instead, the 2-year low P/E dummy remains statistically 
significant at the 1% level in Model 5. In addition, Target price high 5% remains statistically 
significant at the 10% level in Model 5. Also, Forecast revisions and Return t-21, t-6 are still the 
most important factors to affect downgrade decision, consistent with earlier findings and prior 
literature. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
14 Regression odds ratio of 0.520 in Model 5 in Table 17. 
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Table 14. The effect of high and low P/E ratios on recommendation downgrades 
This table shows the predictability of approaching the high and low forward-looking P/E ratios on recommendation downgrades. Conditional logit regression is: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑃/𝐸 𝑓𝑟𝑤𝑑𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 , where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. Dependent variable 
Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. Approach P/E frwd equals 1 if forward-looking P/E at day t-1 is within 5% below 
(above) the high (low) P/E ratio in Panel A (in Panel B). The P/E ratio that the approach dummy is approaching is indicated in the column headlines, from 1-year high up to 10-
year high P/E ratios in Panel A and from 1-year low up to 10-year low P/E ratios in Panel B. Regressions are tested with additional control variables of Approach52, Target, 
Apporach52low which are seen to affect the downgrades in earlier regressions. Approach52 (Approach52low) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% 
below (above) the 52-week high (low). Target is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the target price issued by the same analyst who revises the 
recommendation. Vector X includes a set of control variables that are not reported and definitions of control variables are found in Table 5. All regressions control for year and 
SIC 10 industry fixed effects. Additional control variables are added when specified. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered 
standard errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for significance and ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: The effect of high P/E on downgrades
Approach 1-year high P/E Approach 2-year high P/E Approach 3-year high P/E Approach 5-year high P/E Approach 10-year high P/E
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z-stat Coef. Sig. z-stat Coef. Sig. z-stat Coef. Sig. z-stat Coef. Sig. z-stat
Approach P/E frwd 0.202 *** 3.61 0.039 0.65 0.282 *** 3.99 0.139 * 1.90 0.178 * 1.90 0.035 0.37 0.114 0.70 -0.004 -0.03 0.092 0.32 -0.019 -0.07
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Approach52 0.357 *** 7.16 0.346 *** 7.36 0.366 *** 7.90 0.370 *** 8.08 0.370 *** 8.09
Target 0.146 * 1.84 0.144 * 1.80 0.148 * 1.85 0.148 * 1.87 0.148 * 1.87
Approach52low 0.386 *** 5.50 0.387 *** 5.51 0.387 *** 5.50 0.386 *** 5.49 0.386 *** 5.49
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508
Wald chi
2 248.69 347.67 254.07 352.20 238.44 347.21 235.36 347.30 234.04 347.11
Pseudo R
2 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019
Panel B: The effect of low P/E ratio on downgrades
Approach 1-year low P/E Approach 2-year low P/E Approach 3-year low P/E Approach 5-year low P/E Approach 10-year low P/E
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z-stat Coef. Sig. z-stat Coef. Sig. z-stat Coef. Sig. z-stat Coef. Sig. z-stat
Approach P/E frwd 0.078 1.25 -0.007 -0.10 0.275 *** 2.99 0.179 * 1.80 0.283 ** 2.51 0.168 1.41 0.354 * 1.93 0.241 1.28 0.196 0.50 0.062 0.15
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Approach52 0.369 *** 8.02 0.372 *** 8.09 0.371 *** 8.07 0.371 *** 8.06 0.370 *** 8.05
Target 0.128 * 1.87 0.150 * 1.90 0.149 * 1.89 0.149 * 1.88 0.148 * 1.87
Approach52low 0.388 *** 5.05 0.338 *** 4.40 0.356 *** 4.81 0.365 *** 5.05 0.384 *** 5.43
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508
Wald chi
2 233.51 347.25 241.45 349.87 238.61 347.89 238.44 348.05 234.49 347.15
Pseudo R
2 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019
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Figure 4. The log odds ratio of being downgraded with nearness to the 2-year high P/E 
Figure 4 shows the log odds ratio of being downgraded with nearness to the 2-year high P/E ratio. Approaching 2-
year high dummy equals 1 if the P/E at trading day t-1 is within x% below the 2-year high P/E, i.e. (1-x) × 2-year 
high P/E < P/E at day t-1 < 2-year high P/E. Results are based on conditional logit regression with all control 
variables defined in Table 5. The logit regression is: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. Plotted 
coefficients are reported as log odds ratios. See Panel A in Table 14 for more information on regressions with 
Approaching 2 year high dummy that has a threshold of 5% below the 2-year high P/E. 
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Figure 5. The log odds ratio of being downgraded with nearness to the 2-year low P/E 
Figure 5 shows the log odds ratio of being downgraded with nearness to the 2-year low P/E ratio. Approaching 2-
year low dummy equals 1 if the P/E at trading day t-1 is within x% above the 2-year low P/E ratio, i.e. 2-year low 
P/E < P/E at day t-1 < (1+x) × 2-year low P/E. Results are based on conditional logit regression with all control 
variables defined in Table 5. The logit regression is: 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ 2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑗 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡, where subscript j and t denote the recommendation revision j issued on day t. Plotted 
coefficients are reported as log odds ratios. See Panel B in Table 14 for more information on regressions with 
Approaching 2-year low P/E dummy that has a threshold of 5% above the 2-year low P/E. 
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Table 15. Correlation matrix of approach dummies 
This table reports the correlations between various approach dummies. Panel A shows the correlations between 
approaching high dummies, Panel B between approaching low dummies and Panel C between the select 
approaching high and low dummies used in the main tests and regressions in Table 16 and Table 17. Approaching 
high dummies are 1 if the value is within 5% below the high value/ratio of the defined time period and 0 otherwise. 
Approaching low dummies are 1 if the value is within 5% above the low value/ratio of the defined time period and 
0 otherwise.  
 
  
Panel A: Correlations with approaching high dummies
Approach dummies 52 week 2 year Target P/E PEG EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
52 week high stock price (1) 1.000
2 year high stock price (2) 0.784 1.000
Below target price 5% (3) 0.144 0.127 1.000
2 year high P/E (4) 0.349 0.415 0.081 1.000
2 year high PEG (5) 0.257 0.277 0.060 0.506 1.000
2 year high EV/EBITDA (6) 0.222 0.265 0.115 0.362 0.170 1.000
2 year high EV/EBIT (7) 0.177 0.207 0.109 0.351 0.170 0.665 1.000
2 year high EV/Sales (8) 0.291 0.359 0.133 0.315 0.174 0.548 0.442 1.000
Panel B: Correlations with approaching low dummies
Approach dummies 52 week 2 year Target P/E PEG EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
52 week low stock price (1) 1.000
2 year low stock price (2) 0.565 1.000
Above target price 5% (3) -0.049 -0.028 1.000
2 year low P/E (4) 0.369 0.287 -0.045 1.000
2 year low PEG (5) 0.254 0.189 -0.038 0.527 1.000
2 year low EV/EBITDA (6) 0.197 0.174 -0.022 0.322 0.186 1.000
2 year low EV/EBIT (7) 0.153 0.133 -0.022 0.283 0.184 0.547 1.000
2 year low EV/Sales (8) 0.271 0.263 -0.031 0.313 0.187 0.479 0.368 1.000
Panel C: Correlations with select approaching high and low dummies
Approach dummies 52 high Target P/E high 52 low P/E low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
52 week high stock price (1) 1.000
Below target price 5% (2) 0.144 1.000
2 year high P/E (3) 0.349 0.081 1.000
52 week low stock price (4) -0.101 -0.049 -0.045 1.000
2 year low P/E (5) -0.073 -0.045 -0.044 0.369 1.000
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Table 16. The effect of 52-week high and low stock price and 2-year high and low P/E 
ratio on recommendation downgrade (Without interaction terms) 
This table shows results of conditional logit regression where dependent variable Downgrade is a dummy that 
equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. Approach 52 week high (Approach 52 week low) is 
a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 52-week high (low). Approach 2 
year high P/E (Approach 2 year low P/E) is a dummy that equals 1 if P/E at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) 
the 2 year high (low). Target price high 5% is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below 
the target price issued by the same analyst who revises the recommendation. Return variables denote for 
cumulative return between days t or months m, where Returnt-5, t-1 is from day t-5 to t-1, Returnt-21, t-6 is from day 
t-21 to t-6, Returnm-6, m-2 is from month -6 to month -2, and Returnm-12, m-7 is from month -12 to month -7. Forecast 
revisions is rolling sum of previous six months’ EPS revisions to price ratio. SUE is the standardized unexpected 
earnings. Size is the natural logarithm of market value at day t-22. B/M is book value of equity divided by market 
value of equity. P/E is price-to-earnings ratio based on actual earnings in the last available fiscal year. Turnover is 
average daily turnover in the previous three months divided by shares outstanding. Accruals are total accruals 
divided by average total assets on a quarterly basis. Capex is rolling sum of capital expenditure in the previous 
four quarters divided by average total assets. Sales growth is the rolling sum of sales in the previous four quarters 
divided by rolling sum of sales in the second preceding set of four quarters. LTG is median consensus long-term 
growth forecast. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals of FF3-factor model. Institutional 
ownership is the ownership of institutes in percentages. Analyst coverage is number of analysts providing one-
year earnings forecasts in prior three months. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation across earnings forecasts 
in the prior three months. Analyst experience is the natural logarithm of recommendation revision year minus 
number of years plus one (or 0 if negative) since the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the firm in question. 
Full definitions of control variables are found in Table 5. All regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry fixed 
effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered standard errors 
by firm and year. OR denotes for Odds ratio and Sig. for significance and ***, **, and * denote the statistical 
significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  
Cond. logit model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Downgrade Coef. OR Sig. z -stat Coef. OR Sig. z -stat Coef. OR Sig. z -stat Coef. OR Sig. z -stat Coef. OR Sig. z -stat
Approach 52 week high 0.300 1.350 *** 8.49 0.292 1.339 *** 7.86 0.305 1.356 *** 8.02 0.331 1.392 *** 6.72 0.349 1.417 *** 7.41
Approach 2 year high P/E 0.135 1.145 ** 2.51 0.126 1.134 ** 2.31 0.085 1.089 1.53 0.153 1.166 ** 2.18 0.138 1.148 * 1.89
Target price high 5% 0.118 1.125 ** 2.57 0.100 1.105 ** 2.03 0.080 1.084 1.61 0.133 1.143 * 1.86 0.146 1.158 * 1.84
Approach 52 week low 0.312 1.366 *** 5.65 0.351 1.420 *** 6.12 0.322 1.380 *** 5.51 0.350 1.419 *** 4.67 0.339 1.404 *** 4.43
Approach 2 year low P/E -0.035 0.965 -0.55 0.014 1.014 0.21 0.077 1.080 1.17 0.167 1.181 * 1.73 0.179 1.196 * 1.79
Return t-5, t-1 -0.076 0.927 -0.33 0.144 1.155 0.61 -0.018 0.982 -0.05 0.057 1.059 0.11
Return t-21, t-6 1.782 5.942 *** 11.74 1.948 7.015 *** 12.16 2.125 8.370 *** 6.58 2.194 8.970 *** 4.28
Return m-6, m-2 -0.379 0.685 *** -6.98 -0.225 0.798 *** -3.77 -0.118 0.889 -1.09 -0.097 0.907 -0.93
Return m-12, m-7 -0.146 0.864 *** -2.85 -0.080 0.923 -1.47 -0.015 0.985 -0.22 -0.048 0.954 -0.45
Forecast revisions -6.399 0.002 *** -7.06 -5.189 0.006 *** -4.35 -4.764 0.009 *** -4.01
SUE 0.014 1.014 1.31 -0.002 0.998 -0.17 -0.007 0.993 -0.43
Size -0.009 0.991 -0.05 0.037 1.038 0.10
B/M 0.331 1.393 0.66 0.331 1.392 0.56
P/E -0.001 0.999 ** -2.05 -0.001 0.999 -1.31
Turnover 0.008 1.008 *** 2.68 0.003 1.003 1.08
Accruals 0.325 1.383 0.66 0.243 1.275 0.60
Capex -0.037 0.964 -0.07 0.070 1.072 0.06
Sales growth 0.319 1.375 0.61 0.276 1.318 0.59
LTG 0.003 1.003 0.31 0.001 1.001 0.06
Idiosyncratic volatility 9.615 14986 0.59
Institutional ownership 0.178 1.195 0.43
Analyst coverage -0.619 0.538 -0.17
Analyst dispersion -0.161 0.851 -0.45
Analyst experience -0.004 0.996 -0.88
Analyst herding 0.278 1.320 *** 3.47
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,258 30,001 28,562 17,684 17,508
Wald chi
2 122.74 341.28 361.68 318.10 354.84
Pseudo R
2 0.003 0.011 0.013 0.018 0.020
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Table 17. The effect of 52-week high and low stock price and 2-year high and low P/E 
ratio on recommendation downgrade (With interaction terms) 
This table shows results of conditional logit regression where dependent variable Downgrade is a dummy that 
equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. Approach 52 week high (Approach 52 week low) is 
a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 52-week high (low). Approach 2 
year high P/E (Approach 2 year low P/E) is a dummy that equals 1 if P/E at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) 
the 2 year high (low). Interaction term is 1 if Approach 52 week high (Approach 52 week low) and Approach 2 
year high (Approach 2 year low) are both 1.  Target price high 5% is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day 
t-1 is within 5% below the target price issued by the same analyst who revises the recommendation. Return 
variables denote for cumulative return between days t or months m, where Returnt-5, t-1 is from day t-5 to t-1, 
Returnt-21, t-6 is from day t-21 to t-6, Returnm-6, m-2 is from month -6 to month -2, and Returnm-12, m-7 is from month  
-12 to month -7. Forecast revisions is rolling sum of previous six months’ EPS revisions to price ratio. SUE is the 
standardized unexpected earnings. Size is the natural logarithm of market value at day t-22. B/M is book value of 
equity divided by market value of equity. P/E is price-to-earnings ratio based on actual earnings in the last available 
fiscal year. Turnover is average daily turnover in the previous three months divided by shares outstanding. 
Accruals are total accruals divided by average total assets on a quarterly basis. Capex is rolling sum of capital 
expenditure in the previous four quarters divided by average total assets. Sales growth is the rolling sum of sales 
in the previous four quarters divided by rolling sum of sales in the second preceding set of four quarters. LTG is 
median consensus long-term growth forecast. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals of 
FF3-factor model. Institutional ownership is the ownership of institutes in percentages. Analyst coverage is number 
of analysts providing one-year earnings forecasts in prior three months. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation 
across earnings forecasts in the prior three months. Analyst experience is the natural logarithm of recommendation 
revision year minus number of years plus one (or 0 if negative) since the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the 
firm in question. Full definitions of control variables are found in Table 5. All regressions control for year and SIC 
10 industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered 
standard errors by firm and year. OR denotes for Odds ratio and Sig. for significance and ***, **, and * denote 
the statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
Cond. logit model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Downgrade Coef. OR Sig. z -stat Coef. OR Sig. z -stat Coef. OR Sig. z -stat Coef. OR Sig. z -stat Coef. OR Sig. z -stat
Approach 52 week high 0.268 1.308 *** 7.23 0.254 1.289 *** 6.47 0.266 1.304 *** 6.62 0.301 1.351 *** 5.74 0.318 1.374 *** 6.40
Approach 2 year high P/E -0.106 0.899 -1.17 -0.141 0.868 -1.54 -0.188 0.828 ** -2.02 -0.042 0.959 -0.37 -0.063 0.939 -0.55
2 year high # 52-week high
1   1 0.384 1.469 *** 3.34 0.422 1.525 *** 3.64 0.432 1.540 *** 3.67 0.323 1.381 ** 2.18 0.332 1.394 ** 2.23
Target price high 5% 0.123 1.131 *** 2.68 0.105 1.110 ** 2.12 0.085 1.089 * 1.71 0.136 1.145 * 1.89 0.149 1.161 * 1.87
Approach 52 week low 0.439 1.550 *** 6.87 0.489 1.631 *** 7.36 0.467 1.595 *** 6.87 0.481 1.617 *** 5.73 0.476 1.610 *** 5.56
Approach 2 year low P/E 0.202 1.224 ** 2.44 0.265 1.304 *** 3.19 0.335 1.398 *** 4.01 0.403 1.496 *** 3.29 0.427 1.532 *** 3.58
2 year low # 52-week low
1   1 -0.612 0.542 *** -4.57 -0.646 0.524 *** -4.80 -0.665 0.514 *** -4.94 -0.621 0.538 *** -3.47 -0.653 0.520 *** -3.76
Return t-5, t-1 -0.011 0.989 -0.05 0.212 1.236 0.89 0.035 1.035 0.09 0.112 1.118 0.22
Return t-21, t-6 1.809 6.102 *** 11.88 1.978 7.227 *** 12.30 2.147 8.562 *** 6.65 2.218 9.188 *** 4.33
Return m-6, m-2 -0.370 0.691 *** -6.82 -0.215 0.807 *** -3.60 -0.112 0.894 -1.04 -0.091 0.913 -0.87
Return m-12, m-7 -0.149 0.861 *** -2.91 -0.083 0.921 -1.52 -0.019 0.981 -0.27 -0.051 0.951 -0.49
Forecast revisions -6.424 0.002 *** -7.08 -5.204 0.005 *** -4.35 -4.785 0.008 *** -4.02
SUE 0.014 1.014 1.27 -0.003 0.997 -0.20 -0.007 0.993 -0.45
Size -0.009 0.991 -0.05 0.037 1.037 0.10
B/M 0.324 1.383 0.64 0.324 1.382 0.54
P/E -0.001 0.999 ** -2.03 -0.001 0.999 -1.30
Turnover 0.008 1.008 *** 2.64 0.003 1.003 1.03
Accruals 0.336 1.400 0.68 0.256 1.292 0.64
Capex -0.022 0.978 -0.04 0.090 1.094 0.08
Sales growth 0.312 1.366 0.60 0.270 1.310 0.58
LTG 0.003 1.003 0.32 0.001 1.001 0.07
Idiosyncratic volatility 9.635 15285 0.59
Institutional ownership 0.182 1.200 0.44
Analyst coverage -0.614 0.541 -0.17
Analyst dispersion -0.169 0.844 -0.48
Analyst experience -0.004 0.996 -0.89
Analyst herding 0.278 1.320 *** 3.47
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,258 30,001 28,562 17,684 17,508
Wald chi
2 148.84 369.91 392.00 330.14 372.18
Pseudo R
2 0.004 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.020
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5.5 Robustness checks for the anchoring effects of the P/E ratio and testing the 
consistency of results with other valuation multiples 
This section shows the results from additional regressions, supporting the evidence found from 
earlier sections. First, anchoring of P/E ratio on recommendation downgrades is tested with 
alternative definitions of P/E ratios using mean forward-looking ratios and actual P/E ratios 
instead of median forward-looking ratios15. Second, it is tested whether the anchoring effect is 
found by using different forward-looking valuation multiples. Third, the main regression results 
from Table 16 are tested by using OLS and probit models. Fourth, robustness of results is tested 
by running subsample regressions on each weekday. Finally, the consistency of results is tested 
with actual values instead of forward-looking values.  
Table 18 shows the conditional logit regression results with alternative definitions of P/E ratios. 
Compared to results in Table 14, results are strongest with median forward-looking P/E ratios 
while mean forward-looking ratios come second and the weakest results are obtained with 
actual P/E ratios. The result is in line with Liu et al. (2001) who show that forward-looking 
earnings explain future returns more than historical ones. Approach dummies based on actual 
P/E ratios and mean forward-looking ratios are statistically significant without additional 
control variables. However, after taking into account additional control variables, both 
Approach 2-year high and Approach 2-year low P/E dummies lose statistical significance.  
When it comes to approach dummies based on mean forward-looking values, the results are 
rather robust with median forward-looking values. With additional control variables included, 
coefficient is 0.139 for median 2-year high dummy (See Table 14) whereas for mean 2-year 
high dummy it is 0.055. With mean values, the dummy loses statistical significance. In the case 
of 2-year low dummies, the mean dummy’s coefficient is 0.221 whereas the median dummy’s 
coefficient is 0.179. Both cases are statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Table 19 shows regression results with different forward-looking valuation multiples with and 
without additional control variables. From valuation multiples, the anchoring effect seems to 
be strongest with the forward-looking P/E dummies. Without additional control variables, 
anchoring effects are also seen from forward-looking EV/EBITDA dummies and high EV/Sales 
dummy as well as low PEG ratio dummy.  When additional control variables are included, only 
approaching 2-year high and low forward-looking P/E dummies and approaching 2-year low 
PEG dummy seem to show statistical significance. The similar results are obtained most likely 
                                                 
15 The ratios are based on consensus EPS estimates, and using the analysts own EPS estimates who make the 
recommendation revision is left for further studies. 
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because there is a high correlation of 0.527 between approach dummies of low P/E and PEG 
ratio as shown in Panel C of Table 15. Nevertheless, based on these results forward-looking EV 
multiples are not the driving the anchoring effects. 
Table 20 shows similar analysis to Table 19 but with historical-looking approach dummies. It 
includes 2-year high and low stock price dummies and actual P/E and actual EV based multiples. 
Results are robust with forward-looking values when additional control variables are included. 
It also shows that 2-year high and low stock price dummies are statistically significant at the 1% 
level without additional control variables and at the 1-5% level with additional control variables. 
It confirms the assumption made in Section 5.4 that results are similar to 52-week high and low 
dummies because the correlation between 52-week high (and low) and 2-year high (and low) 
stock prices is 0.784 (and 0.565).  
Table 21 and Table 22 show regression results based on OLS and probit regressions, similarly 
to the main test in Table 16. Both regressions support the importance of 52-week high and 52-
week low dummies, showing statistical significance at the 1% level in all model specifications. 
Target price high 5%, Approaching 2-year high P/E and Approaching 2-year low P/E dummies 
show statistical significance at the 5-10% level in probit regression (Model 5) but lose statistical 
significance in OLS regression (Model 5) except for the Approaching 2-year low P/E dummy 
which stays significant at the 10% level. It is also seen that Forecast revisions and  
Return t-21, t-6 are most important factors to affect downgrade decisions which is in line with all 
earlier results.  
Table 23 shows the robustness of results with subsamples based on weekdays. Regressions are 
run separately for each weekday to see if the results differ e.g. in the beginning of the week. It 
reveals whether variables that are based on shorter time periods show any differences between 
weekdays, such as Return variables. Recent price momentum is partly captured by two variables 
that are based on a relatively short time period: Return t-5, t-1 are Return t-21, t-6. The subsample 
results show that Forecast revisions and Return t-21, t-6 are not statistically significant anymore 
in all weekdays. Return t-21, t-6 is statistically significant at the 10% level in three days and 
insignificant in other weekdays. Forecast revisions is statistically significant at the 1% level on 
Monday and at the 5% level on Wednesday and insignicant on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday. 
The magnitude and direction of coefficients are robust with results in earlier sections for both 
Return and Forecast revisions variables.  
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Moreover, it seems that 52-week high and low dummies are the most important factors with 
this subsample. Approach 52 week high is statistically significant at the 1% level in Monday, 
Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday and at the 5% level in Thursday. The magnitude and direction 
of the coefficients is also in line with the main results, ranging from 0.287 on Friday to 0.426 
on Tuesday. Approach 52 week low is statistically significant at the 5% level on Wednesday 
and Friday and at the 10% level on Monday and Tuesday and insignificant on Thursday. The 
magnitude and direction of the coefficients are robust with the main tests in the earlier sections. 
Results support the significance of anchoring effect of the 52-week high and low phenomena 
and indicate that historical stock prices are more important reference points in analyst decision 
making than reference points based on valuation ratios.  
 
Table 18. Alternative definitions of P/E ratios 
This table shows the conditional logit regression results with alternative definitions of P/E ratios. Dependent 
variable Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. Approach 2-
year high (low) dummy equals 1 if the Approach dummy is within 5% below (above) the P/E mean forward ratio 
or the P/E actual ratio. Regressions are tested with and without additional control variables of Approach52, Target, 
Apporach52low which are seen to affect the downgrades in earlier regressions. Approach52 (Approach52low) is 
a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 52-week high (low). Target is a 
dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the target price issued by the same analyst who 
revises the recommendation. Coefficients of additional control variables and control variables are not reported. 
Definitions of control variables are found in Table 5. All regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry fixed 
effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered standard errors 
by firm and year. Additional control variables are added when specified. 
 
  
Cond. logit model P/E mean forward P/E mean forward P/E actual P/E actual
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach 2 year high P/E 0.196 ** 2.29 0.055 0.64 0.229 *** 3.06 0.029 0.36
Approach 2 year low P/E 0.327 *** 2.93 0.221 * 1.89 0.280 ** 2.18 0.091 0.69
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,508 17,508 17,508 17,508
Wald chi
2 247.06 348.74 252.92 347.28
Pseudo R
2 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.019
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Table 19. Different forward-looking valuation multiples 
This table shows the conditional logit regression results with different forward-looking valuation multiples. 
Dependent variable Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. 
Approach 2-year high (low) dummy equals 1 if the Approach dummy is within 5% below (above) the ratio defined 
in the headline of the Columns 2-6. Regressions are tested with and without additional control variables of 
Approach52, Target, Apporach52low which are seen to affect the downgrades in earlier regressions. Approach52 
(Approach52low) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 52-week high 
(low). Target is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the target price issued by the 
same analyst who revises the recommendation. Coefficients of additional control variables and control variables 
are not reported. Definitions of control variables are found in Table 5. All regressions control for year and SIC 10 
industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered 
standard errors by firm and year. Additional control variables are added when specified. 
 
  
Cond. logit model Forward P/E ratio Forward PEG-ratio Forward EV/EBITDA Forward EV/EBIT Forward EV/Sales
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach 2 year high (variable) 0.285 *** 4.02 0.120 1.49 0.240 ** 2.59 0.094 0.86 0.231 *** 2.75
Approach 2 year low (variable) 0.279 *** 3.03 0.315 *** 2.77 0.257 ** 2.24 0.236 1.55 0.147 1.45
Additional controls No No No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,508 16,335 7,418 5,526 11,129
Wald chi
2 261.90 218.77 246.58 172.16 246.88
Pseudo R
2 0.016 0.014 0.031 0.029 0.024
Cond. logit model Forward P/E ratio Forward PEG-ratio Forward EV/EBITDA Forward EV/EBIT Forward EV/Sales
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach 2 year high (variable) 0.138 * 1.89 0.012 0.15 0.111 1.13 -0.045 -0.38 0.073 0.80
Approach 2 year low (variable) 0.179 * 1.79 0.240 ** 2.05 0.174 1.47 0.190 1.24 0.038 0.35
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,508 16,335 7,418 5,526 11,129
Wald chi
2 354.84 308.57 284.36 207.54 306.42
Pseudo R
2 0.020 0.018 0.034 0.033 0.028
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Table 20. Alternative historical-looking approach dummies 
This table shows the conditional logit regression results with different historical-looking valuation multiples. 
Dependent variable Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. 
Approach 2-year high (low) dummy equals 1 if the Approach dummy is within 5% below (above) the ratio defined 
in the headline of the Columns 2-6. Regressions are tested with and without additional control variables of 
Approach52, Target, Apporach52low which are seen to affect the downgrades in earlier regressions. Approach52 
(Approach52low) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 52-week high 
(low). Target is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the target price issued by the 
same analyst who revises the recommendation. Coefficients of additional control variables and control variables 
are not reported. Definitions of control variables are found in Table 5. All regressions control for year and SIC 10 
industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered 
standard errors by firm and year. Additional control variables are added when specified. 
 
  
Cond. logit model 2-year stock price Actual P/E ratio Actual EV/EBITDA Actual EV/EBIT Actual EV/Sales
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach high (variable) 0.399 *** 7.11 0.259 *** 4.19 0.218 ** 2.18 0.241 ** 2.40 0.232 *** 2.93
Approach low (variable) 0.581 *** 5.22 0.217 ** 2.51 0.131 1.34 0.133 1.15 0.211 ** 2.36
Additional controls No No No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,508 17,508 7,418 5,526 11,129
Wald chi
2 329.09 265.00 241.75 177.76 250.61
Pseudo R
2 0.019 0.016 0.030 0.029 0.024
Cond. logit model 2-year stock price Actual P/E ratio Actual EV/EBITDA Actual EV/EBIT Actual EV/Sales
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach high (variable) 0.187 ** 2.09 0.057 0.83 0.057 0.52 0.076 0.72 0.055 0.65
Approach low (variable) 0.379 *** 3.01 0.051 0.55 0.000 0.00 0.053 0.43 0.096 0.96
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,508 17,508 7,418 5,526 11,129
Wald chi
2 358.39 349.88 282.44 209.09 305.84
Pseudo R
2 0.020 0.019 0.034 0.033 0.028
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Table 21. OLS regression 
This table shows results of OLS regression where dependent variable is Recommendation revision which gets 
values between -4 to 4 where positive values indicate upgrades and negative values downgrades. Approach 52 
week high (Approach 52 week low) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) 
the 52-week high (low) stock price. Approach 2 year high P/E (Approach 2 year low P/E) is a dummy that equals 
1 if P/E at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 2 year high (low). Target price high 5% is a dummy that equals 
1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below the target price issued by the same analyst who revises the 
recommendation. Return variables denote for cumulative return between days t or months m, where Returnt-5, t-1 is 
from day t-5 to t-1, Returnt-21, t-6 is from day t-21 to t-6, Returnm-6, m-2 is from month -6 to month -2, and  
Returnm-12, m-7 is from month -12 to month -7. Forecast revisions is rolling sum of previous six months’ EPS 
revisions to price ratio. SUE is the standardized unexpected earnings. Size is the natural logarithm of market value 
at day t-22. B/M is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. P/E is price-to-earnings ratio based on 
actual earnings in the last available fiscal year. Turnover is average daily turnover in the previous three months 
divided by shares outstanding. Accruals are total accruals divided by average total assets on a quarterly basis. 
Capex is rolling sum of capital expenditure in the previous four quarters divided by average total assets. Sales 
growth is the rolling sum of sales in the previous four quarters divided by rolling sum of sales in the second 
preceding set of four quarters. LTG is median consensus long-term growth forecast. Idiosyncratic volatility is the 
standard deviation of the residuals of FF3-factor model. Institutional ownership is the ownership of institutes in 
percentages. Analyst coverage is number of analysts providing one-year earnings forecasts in prior three months. 
Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation across earnings forecasts in the prior three months. Analyst experience 
is the natural logarithm of recommendation revision year minus number of years plus one (or 0 if negative) since 
the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the firm in question. Full definitions of control variables are found in 
Table 5. All regressions control for firm and year fixed effects and t-statistics are based on two-way clustered 
standard errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for significance and ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance 
levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  
OLS model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Recommendation revision Coef. Sig. t -stat Coef. Sig. t -stat Coef. Sig. t -stat Coef. Sig. t -stat Coef. Sig. t -stat
Approach 52 week high -0.234 *** -9.23 -0.215 *** -8.15 -0.218 *** -8.11 -0.223 *** -6.39 -0.232 *** -6.59
Approach 2 year high P/E -0.125 *** -3.22 -0.116 *** -2.98 -0.081 ** -2.05 -0.093 * -1.81 -0.083 -1.60
Target price high 5% -0.099 *** -2.92 -0.075 ** -2.09 -0.062 * -1.70 -0.069 -1.50 -0.074 -1.58
Approach 52 week low -0.238 *** -5.77 -0.266 *** -6.29 -0.240 *** -5.58 -0.247 *** -4.36 -0.236 *** -4.15
Approach 2 year low P/E 0.023 0.47 -0.014 -0.28 -0.057 -1.15 -0.099 -1.51 -0.110 * -1.69
Return t-5, t-1 -0.084 -0.49 -0.221 -1.25 -0.397 * -1.76 -0.454 ** -2.02
Return t-21, t-6 -1.355 *** -12.70 -1.432 *** -12.91 -1.804 *** -12.55 -1.829 *** -12.69
Return m-6, m-2 0.244 *** 6.18 0.127 *** 2.97 -0.011 -0.20 -0.032 -0.56
Return m-12, m-7 0.118 *** 3.28 0.056 1.45 -0.015 -0.30 0.000 0.00
Forecast revisions 4.363 *** 7.69 2.590 *** 3.48 2.341 *** 3.13
SUE -0.010 -1.39 -0.002 -0.23 0.001 0.14
Size -0.168 *** -5.50 -0.182 *** -5.00
B/M -0.732 *** -8.93 -0.706 *** -8.48
P/E 0.002 *** 3.05 0.002 *** 2.78
Turnover -0.007 *** -2.65 -0.003 -1.14
Accruals -0.167 -0.64 -0.124 -0.48
Capex -0.701 * -1.78 -0.677 * -1.69
Sales growth -0.487 *** -6.12 -0.474 *** -5.85
LTG 0.002 0.84 0.004 1.23
Idiosyncratic volatility -7.757 *** -3.83
Institutional ownership -0.012 -0.12
Analyst coverage -0.160 -0.50
Analyst dispersion 0.204 * 1.91
Analyst experience 0.005 ** 2.08
Analyst herding -0.216 *** -4.43
Intercept -0.175 -1.53 -0.146 -1.20 -0.121 -0.99 4.407 *** 6.11 7.740 *** 5.84
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,270 30,015 28,572 17,713 17,537
F-test 13.68 17.55 17.60 13.19 12.72
Adjusted R
2 -0.008 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.015
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Table 22. Probit regression 
This table shows results of probit regression where dependent variable is Downgrade which is a dummy that equals 
1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. Approach 52 week high (Approach 52 week low) is a 
dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 52-week high (low) stock price. 
Approach 2 year high P/E (Approach 2 year low P/E) is a dummy that equals 1 if P/E at day t-1 is within 5% 
below (above) the 2 year high (low). Target price high 5% is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is 
within 5% below the target price issued by the same analyst who revises the recommendation. Return variables 
denote for cumulative return between days t or months m, where Returnt-5, t-1 is from day t-5 to t-1, Returnt-21, t-6 is 
from day t-21 to t-6, Returnm-6, m-2 is from month -6 to month -2, and Returnm-12, m-7 is from month -12 to month -7. 
Forecast revisions is rolling sum of previous six months’ EPS revisions to price ratio. SUE is the standardized 
unexpected earnings. Size is the natural logarithm of market value at day t-22. B/M is book value of equity divided 
by market value of equity. P/E is price-to-earnings ratio based on actual earnings in the last available fiscal year. 
Turnover is average daily turnover in the previous three months divided by shares outstanding. Accruals are total 
accruals divided by average total assets on a quarterly basis. Capex is rolling sum of capital expenditure in the 
previous four quarters divided by average total assets. Sales growth is the rolling sum of sales in the previous four 
quarters divided by rolling sum of sales in the second preceding set of four quarters. LTG is median consensus 
long-term growth forecast. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals of FF3-factor model. 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of institutes in percentages. Analyst coverage is number of analysts 
providing one-year earnings forecasts in prior three months. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation across 
earnings forecasts in the prior three months. Analyst experience is the natural logarithm of recommendation 
revision year minus number of years plus one (or 0 if negative) since the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the 
firm in question. Full definitions of control variables are found in Table 5. All regressions control for firm and 
year fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered 
standard errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for significance and ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance 
levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  
Probit model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach 52 week high 0.184 *** 8.94 0.183 *** 8.47 0.193 *** 8.76 0.210 *** 7.42 0.222 *** 7.75
Approach 2 year high P/E 0.088 *** 2.68 0.084 ** 2.53 0.057 * 1.68 0.091 ** 2.12 0.082 * 1.88
Target price high 5% 0.074 *** 2.73 0.065 ** 2.24 0.053 * 1.78 0.081 ** 2.18 0.090 ** 2.37
Approach 52 week low 0.199 *** 5.96 0.219 *** 6.36 0.199 *** 5.68 0.218 *** 4.81 0.212 *** 4.65
Approach 2 year low P/E -0.019 -0.48 0.010 0.24 0.052 1.28 0.110 ** 2.08 0.119 ** 2.26
Return t-5, t-1 -0.077 -0.55 0.060 0.41 -0.031 -0.17 0.022 0.12
Return t-21, t-6 1.096 *** 11.83 1.193 *** 12.23 1.285 *** 10.70 1.323 *** 11.01
Return m-6, m-2 -0.247 *** -7.59 -0.142 *** -3.99 -0.070 -1.54 -0.056 -1.22
Return m-12, m-7 -0.099 *** -3.44 -0.052 * -1.68 -0.013 -0.32 -0.031 -0.75
Forecast revisions -4.096 *** -8.36 -3.523 *** -5.41 -3.257 *** -5.00
SUE 0.011 ** 2.39 0.001 0.13 -0.002 -0.32
Size -0.007 -1.15 0.018 * 1.96
B/M 0.189 *** 4.80 0.185 *** 4.58
P/E -0.001 ** -2.31 -0.001 ** -2.30
Turnover 0.004 *** 3.12 0.001 0.66
Accruals 0.149 0.74 0.103 0.51
Capex 0.039 0.21 0.081 0.43
Sales growth 0.237 *** 4.06 0.212 *** 3.62
LTG 0.001 0.70 -0.001 -0.35
Idiosyncratic volatility 6.119 *** 4.26
Institutional ownership 0.118 ** 2.57
Analyst coverage -0.319 ** -1.99
Analyst dispersion -0.079 -1.41
Analyst experience -0.003 -1.40
Analyst herding 0.171 *** 4.05
Intercept 0.231 ** 2.32 0.180 * 1.73 0.122 1.17 0.0391 0.12 -0.566 ** -2.29
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,270 30,015 28,572 17.713 17,537
Wald chi
2 395.09 568.54 597.17 457.02 508.72
Pseudo R
2 0.007 0.015 0.017 0.021 0.023
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Table 23. Subsamples with weekdays 
This table shows subsample results with weekdays of conditional logit regression where dependent variable 
Downgrade is a dummy that equals 1 for recommendation downgrades and 0 for upgrades. Approach 52 week 
high (Approach 52 week low) is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price at day t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 
52-week high (low). Approach 2 year high P/E (Approach 2 year low P/E) is a dummy that equals 1 if P/E at day 
t-1 is within 5% below (above) the 2 year high (low). Target price high 5% is a dummy that equals 1 if stock price 
at day t-1 is within 5% below the target price issued by the same analyst who revises the recommendation. Return 
variables denote for cumulative return between days t or months m, where Returnt-5, t-1 is from day t-5 to t-1, 
Returnt-21, t-6 is from day t-21 to t-6, Returnm-6, m-2 is from month -6 to month -2, and Returnm-12, m-7 is from month  
-12 to month -7. Forecast revisions is rolling sum of previous six months’ EPS revisions to price ratio. SUE is the 
standardized unexpected earnings. Size is the natural logarithm of market value at day t-22. B/M is book value of 
equity divided by market value of equity. P/E is price-to-earnings ratio based on actual earnings in the last available 
fiscal year. Turnover is average daily turnover in the previous three months divided by shares outstanding. 
Accruals are total accruals divided by average total assets on a quarterly basis. Capex is rolling sum of capital 
expenditure in the previous four quarters divided by average total assets. Sales growth is the rolling sum of sales 
in the previous four quarters divided by rolling sum of sales in the second preceding set of four quarters. LTG is 
median consensus long-term growth forecast. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals of 
FF3-factor model. Institutional ownership is the ownership of institutes in percentages. Analyst coverage is number 
of analysts providing one-year earnings forecasts in prior three months. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation 
across earnings forecasts in the prior three months. Analyst experience is the natural logarithm of recommendation 
revision year minus number of years plus one (or 0 if negative) since the analyst gave its first EPS estimate for the 
firm in question. All regressions control for year and SIC 10 industry fixed effects. Coefficients are reported as 
log odds ratios and z-statistics are based on two-way clustered standard errors by firm and year. Sig. denotes for 
significance and ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Cond. logit model Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Downgrade Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat Coef. Sig. z -stat
Approach 52 week high 0.318 *** 2.63 0.426 *** 4.02 0.345 *** 2.87 0.392 *** 3.38 0.287 ** 2.40
Approach 2 year high P/E 0.145 0.90 0.028 0.15 0.200 1.22 0.138 0.62 0.098 0.56
Target price high 5% 0.102 0.59 0.357 * 1.80 0.167 0.79 0.038 0.22 0.086 0.53
Approach 52 week low 0.334 * 1.82 0.340 * 1.86 0.352 ** 2.21 0.230 1.36 0.441 ** 1.98
Approach 2 year low P/E 0.182 0.65 0.026 0.12 0.280 1.36 0.207 0.90 -0.028 -0.11
Return t-5, t-1 0.062 0.05 0.596 0.52 0.756 0.49 -0.931 -0.89 -0.479 -0.35
Return t-21, t-6 2.438 * 1.87 1.984 1.33 1.731 * 1.76 2.536 * 2.01 2.425 1.60
Return m-6, m-2 0.104 0.31 -0.402 * -1.75 -0.052 -0.26 -0.067 -0.22 -0.032 -0.11
Return m-12, m-7 0.033 0.13 -0.065 -0.29 0.107 0.41 -0.148 -0.60 -0.185 -0.63
Forecast revisions -9.159 *** -3.46 -0.574 -0.22 -6.089 ** -2.01 -4.304 -1.39 -2.871 -0.91
SUE -0.042 -0.99 -0.058 * -1.93 0.006 0.11 0.055 1.56 0.006 0.14
Size 0.099 0.11 0.044 0.05 -0.010 -0.01 0.030 0.03 0.021 0.02
B/M 0.349 0.26 0.199 0.13 0.170 0.12 0.383 0.22 0.539 0.28
P/E -0.001 -0.72 0.000 0.13 -0.001 -0.33 -0.003 -0.99 -0.001 -0.24
Turnover 0.002 0.34 -0.012 -1.26 -0.002 -0.19 0.013 1.57 0.011 1.73
Accruals 0.331 0.28 1.142 0.97 -1.008 -1.35 1.005 0.95 0.466 0.42
Capex 0.538 0.18 -1.106 -0.40 -0.146 -0.05 1.577 0.55 -0.860 -0.30
Sales growth 0.605 0.46 0.245 0.24 0.211 0.18 -0.001 0.00 0.460 0.38
LTG -0.001 -0.07 -0.002 -0.08 -0.007 -0.28 0.005 0.20 0.007 0.22
Idiosyncratic volatility 7.636 0.21 21.027 0.45 7.389 0.18 5.661 0.14 5.102 0.12
Institutional ownership 0.323 0.30 0.391 0.30 0.047 0.05 0.022 0.02 -0.039 -0.04
Analyst coverage -1.756 -0.19 -0.788 -0.08 -0.462 -0.05 -0.451 -0.05 0.322 0.03
Analyst dispersion -0.497 -0.60 0.171 0.19 0.063 0.06 -0.041 -0.05 -0.425 -0.42
Analyst experience -0.013 -0.79 -0.003 -0.36 0.010 0.83 -0.004 -0.29 -0.008 -0.70
Analyst herding -0.018 -0.09 0.129 0.40 0.440 * 1.70 0.263 1.64 0.420 ** 2.40
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,638 3,380 3,642 3,682 3,004
Wald chi
2 94.36 98.90 74.92 96.49 74.95
Pseudo R
2 0.027 0.027 0.020 0.026 0.028
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6. Conclusion 
This thesis studies the functions of historical stock price and valuation anchors on analyst 
recommendation revisions. The anchors I have analyzed include the most commonly used 
relative valuation multiples and 52-week high and low stock prices. A specific focus is on the 
relative valuation multiples, particularly in forward-looking P/E ratio since analysts often 
justify their recommendations with P/E ratio (Bradshaw, 2002). The sample consists of 35,270 
analyst recommendation revisions from 5,193 analysts for 1,454 unique US stock-listed 
companies during the period of November 1993 to September 2015.  
A key finding is that analysts partly anchor their views on the company by using both the 52-
week high and low stock prices as reference points to revise their recommendations. The odds 
of being downgraded by analysts are 44.8% higher for companies approaching the 52-week 
high stock price and 43.6% higher for companies approaching the 52-week low stock price16. 
The effect is stronger with the 52-week high stock price and also robustness checks support the 
findings. Furthermore, results suggest that analysts may also somewhat anchor to their own 
target prices when revising their recommendations. However, the target price findings are only 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
The findings on the 52-week high and low are partially consistent with prior literature. Li et al. 
(2016) find similar reaction with the 52-week high stock price but they do not find statistical 
significance for the 52-week low reference point. However, academic literature is mixed on the 
effect of the 52-week low as there are also many papers suggesting that 52-week low is an 
important anchor for investors and e.g. George and Hwang (2004) find negative abnormal 
returns for stocks trading close to their 52-week low. Furthermore, one could argue that if the 
52-week low stock price is important anchor for investors, it is also important for analysts 
because analysts’ beliefs are seen as a good proxy for the beliefs held by investors in general 
(Bradshaw, 2011). 
My thesis also provides new insight on anchoring to valuation multiples. To my best knowledge, 
the effects of relative valuation multiples on analyst recommendation revisions have not been 
studied before. My results show that analysts tend to downgrade stock recommendations when 
median forward-looking P/E ratio is approaching the 2-year high and 2-year low P/E ratio. 
Nevertheless, results of the anchoring effect on P/E ratios are statistically significant merely at 
the 10% level when the anchoring effects of the 52-week high and low stock price as well as 
                                                 
16 Including all control variables (results from Table 8 and Table 9). 
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analysts’ own target price are also controlled in the regressions. Then, the odds of being 
downgraded by analysts are 14.8% and 19.6% higher for companies when the P/E ratio is 
approaching the 2-year high and 2-year low P/E, respectively. The magnitude is substantial but 
over two times smaller compared to the 52-week high and low phenomena where the odds of 
being downgraded are over 40% higher for companies approaching either the 52-week high or 
low than that for other companies17. In addition, another interesting finding is that when the P/E 
and stock price are approaching the 2-year low P/E and 52-week low stock price at the same 
time, the effect on downgrade is strongly inverse and thus the analyst is more likely to upgrade 
the recommendation in these reference points. One potential explanation is an underreaction to 
company-specific negative earnings news and that the stock has hit a ‘support level’ in the 
analyst’s mind meaning that the analyst thinks that stock price cannot continue to drop further.   
When it comes to other commonly used valuation multiples and alternative measures, it seems 
that even though there is a positive correlation between the high (low) P/E approach dummies 
to the high (low) approach dummies based on other valuation multiples, anchoring effects are 
most strongly present by using the median forward-looking P/E multiples. Only approaching 
the 2-year low PEG dummy shows statistical significance from the forward-looking valuation 
multiples tested when all controls are included. Nevertheless, this is fully in line with the 
findings of Bradshaw (2002) who finds that on top of P/E ratio, analysts also use PEG ratio to 
justify their recommendations.  
However, the effect of anchoring on the P/E ratio loses statistical significance in a robustness 
check where regressions are run separately for each weekday. The same holds true for the two 
most important control variables that are actually the most powerful variables and have the 
greatest effect on downgrades. These control variables yield statistically significant results at 
the 1% level in all the main tests. A stock’s recent price momentum in the previous weeks 
(cumulative return between trading days t-21 and t-6 before the recommendation revision day 
t) seem to increase the odds of downgrading substantially whereas an increase in the sum of 
prior six months’ earnings forecast revisions (scaled by price) seem to decrease the odds of 
downgrading substantially. 
This thesis offers numerous possibilities for further research in analyzing the analysts’ decision-
making process. Even though the literature on analysts is vast, there is only a limited number 
of studies analyzing the behavioral side of analysts regarding how analysts actually process 
                                                 
17 Results from Table 16 with all control variables. 
69 
 
information and draw conclusions. The main avenue for further research would be studying 
more on the anchoring effects based on the rule-of-thumb valuation heuristics. For instance, 
this thesis focuses on the effect of P/E ratios derived from consensus earnings estimates. 
Another potential measure is using the analyst’s own earnings estimates. There is mixed 
evidence on how analysts incorporate their own earnings estimates into their recommendations 
but this would be an interesting new avenue for further studies. Furthermore, one topic for 
further studies would be investigating whether analysts anchor their recommendation revisions 
to the industry level valuation ratios. However, each analyst may perceive a company’s 
peer/industry group differently and thus researchers should be open for alternative methods of 
measuring these anchoring effects. It would also be interesting to examine what effect the 
analyst’s industry knowledge plays in the decision making – how the decision making process 
differs between analysts focusing on one industry and analysts focusing on multiple industries. 
Are analysts focusing on multiple industries more prone to use rule-of-thumb heuristics to 
revise their recommendations?  
To conclude, reference points based on historical stock prices such as 52-week high and low 
stock prices seem to drive the results more than valuation based reference points. The results 
support the conclusion that the anchoring phenomenon weakens when P/E and PEG multiples 
are used and results weaken even further when other market multiples are used. Analysts partly 
anchor their recommendation revisions to 52-week high and low stock prices, resulting in an 
increased downgrade probability near these price points. Thus, analysts are more likely to make 
better recommendation decisions if they acknowledge the possibility that they are anchoring 
their revisions to these reference points that may have no informational value. Investors may 
also be better off if they avoid making investment decisions based on analyst downgrades when 
stock prices are approaching the 52-week high and low. 
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Appendix 
Figure 6. Illustration of forecast horizon for Apple Inc. 
 
This figure illustrates how forward-looking earnings estimates are used in this thesis. Apple Inc. is used as an 
example18 and Apple’s quarterly and annual earnings announcement months between the end of 2014 and 2016 
are illustrated. Calculating daily P/E multiples for 2016 using earnings estimates from the same fiscal year 2016 
(fpi=1) may be misleading as accuracy changes significantly during the year and estimates are only slightly 
forward-looking when the end of the period comes closer. Thus, when new quarterly earnings are announced, 
estimation accuracy for the fiscal year increases. However, accuracy remains relatively stable for estimates for the 
next fiscal year (fpi=2) as there is at least 12 months to wait until the announcement of the annual results. Apple 
Inc’s estimates for the next fiscal period 2016 (fpi=2) are given from 10/2014 until 10/2015. Accuracy remains 
relatively similar between the beginning and in the end of that forecast period as they are more forward-looking 
compared to current fiscal year estimates (fpi=1).  
Nevertheless, I consider it important to smooth the next fiscal year estimates (fpi=2) by using the first two months 
of the current fiscal year estimates (fpi=1) in order to diminish the time period jump after the publishing of annual 
results. By then, an analyst has had enough time to revise their recommendations (1-2 months). Analysts often 
revise their recommendations after earnings announcements (Yezegel, 2015) and if I only use estimates for the 
next fiscal year (fpi=2), the estimation window after the announcement of annual results would jump from ~12 
months to ~24 months. In the example, there are 12 months until the end of the next fiscal period in October 2015 
but in November 2015, there are 24 months until the end of the next fiscal year period (as the period changes). If 
the period is not smoothed, there could be many high and low points of P/E after the annual results have become 
public that are actually due to the change in earnings estimation window, biasing the results. 
                                                 
18 See Apple’s earnings announcement dates from the website http://investor.apple.com/financials.cfm (accessed 
21.12.2016). 
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